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Abstract 
Traditionally, the core of a Terminological Knowledge Representation System (TKRS) consists 
of a TBox or terminology, where concepts are introduced, and an ABox or world description, 
where facts about individuals are stated in terms of concept memberships. This design has a 
drawback because in most applications the TBox has to meet two functions at a time: On the one 
hand-similarly to a database schema-frame-like structures with type information are introduced 
through primitive concepts and primitive roles; on the other hand, views on the objects in the 
knowledge base are provided through defined concepts. 
We propose to account for this conceptual separation by partitioning the TBox into two compo- 
nents for primitive and defined concepts, which we call the schema and the view part. We envision 
the two parts to differ with respect o the language for concepts, the statements allowed, and the 
semantics. 
We argue that this separation achieves more conceptual clarity about the role of primitive 
and defined concepts and the semantics of terminological cycles. Two case studies show the 
computational benefits to be gained from the refined architecture. @ 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Research on terminological reasoning usually presupposes the following abstract ar- 
chitecture of a knowledge representation system, which quite well reflects the structure 
of implemented systems. There is a logical representation language that allows for two 
kinds of statements: In the TBox, or terminology, concept descriptions are introduced, 
and in the ABox, or world description, individuals are characterized in terms of concept 
membership and role relationship. This abstract architecture has been the basis for the 
design of systems, such as CLASSIC [ 51, BACK [ 311, LOOM [ 261, and KRIS [ 31, the 
development of algorithms (see e.g., [28]), and the investigation of the computational 
properties of inferences (see e.g., [ 17,291) . 
Given this setting, there are three parameters that characterize a terminological system: 
(i)the language for concept descriptions, (ii)the form of the statements allowed, and 
(iii) the semantics given to concepts and statements. Research tried to improve systems 
by modifying these three parameters. But in all existing systems and almost all theoretical 
studies language and semantics are supposed to be uniform for all components.4 
The results of those studies were unsatisfactory in at least two respects. First, it seems 
that tractable inferences are only possible for languages with little expressivity. Second, 
no consensus has been reached about the semantics of terminological cycles, although 
in applications the need to model cyclic dependencies between classes of objects arises 
constantly (see, e.g., [ 271) . 
We suggest to refine the two-layered architecture consisting of TBox and ABox. 
Our goal is twofold: On the one hand, we want to achieve more conceptual clarity 
about the role of primitive and defined concepts and the semantics of terminological 
cycles; on the other hand, we want to improve the tradeoff between expressivity and 
worst-case complexity. Since our changes are not primarily motivated by mathematical 
considerations but by the way systems are used, we expect to come up with a more 
practical system design. 
In applications we found that the TBox has to meet two functions at a time. One 
is to declare frame-like structures by introducing primitive concepts and roles, together 
with type information like isa-relationships between concepts, or range restrictions and 
number restrictions of roles. For example, suppose we want to model a company envi- 
ronment. Then we may introduce the concept Employee with slots lives-in of type City, 
works-for of type Department, salary of type Salary, and boss of type Manager. The 
slots lives-in and salary have exactly one filler, works-for may have more than one filler. 
The concept Manager is a specialization of Employee, having a salary in HighSalary. 
Such introductions are similar to class declarations in object-oriented systems. For this 
purpose, a language with limited expressivity is sufficient. Cycles occur naturally in 
modeling tasks, e.g., the boss of an Employee is a Manager and therefore also an 
Employee. These declarations have no definitional import; they just restrict the set of 
possible interpretations. 
4 In 1241 a combination of a weak language for ABoxes and a strong language for queries has been 
investigated. 
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The second function of a TBox is to define new concepts in terms of primitive ones 
by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for concept membership. This can be 
seen as defining abstractions or views on the objects in the knowledge base. Defined 
concepts are important for querying the knowledge base and as left-hand sides of trigger 
rules. For this purpose we need more expressive languages. If cycles occur in this part 
they must have definitional import. 
As an outcome of our analysis we propose to split the TBox into two components: one 
for declaring frame structures and one for defining views. By analogy to the structure 
of databases we call the first component the schema and the second one the view part. 
We envision the two parts to differ with respect to the language, the form of statements, 
and the semantics of cycles. 
The schema consists of a set of primitive concept introductions, formulated in the 
schema language, and the view part consists of a set of concept definitions, formulated 
in the view language. In general, the schema language will be less expressive than the 
view language. Since the role of statements in the schema is to restrict the set of possible 
interpretations, first order semantics-also called descriptive semantics in this context 
(see [ 301 )-is adequate for cycles occurring in the schema. For cycles in the view part, 
we propose to choose a semantics that defines concepts uniquely, e.g., least or greatest 
fixpoint semantics. 
The purpose of this work is not to present the full-fledged design of a new sys- 
tem, but to explore the options that arise from the separation of the TBox into schema 
and views Among the benefits to be gained from this refinement are the following 
three. First, the new architecture has more degrees of freedom for improving sys- 
tems, since language, form of statements, and semantics can be specified differently 
for schema and views. In fact, we found a combination of schema and view language 
that allows for polynomial inference procedures whereas merging the two languages 
into one leads to intractability. Second, we believe that one of the obstacles to a con- 
sensus about the semantics of terminological cycles has been precisely the fact that 
no distinction has been made between primitive and defined concepts. Moreover, in- 
tractability of reasoning with cycles mostly refers to inferences with defined concepts. 
We proved that reasoning with cycles is easier when only primitive concepts are consid- 
ered. Third, the refined architecture allows for more differentiated complexity measures, 
which yields a more fine-grained picture of the computational complexity of reason- 
ing. 
Beside the proposal for a new architecture, the paper presents various technical results 
on the semantics and the complexity of terminological reasoning. First, we analyse the 
effect of fixpoint semantics for inclusion axioms and we provide some equivalence 
results for various semantics proposed in the literature [ 28,351. Second, we provide 
complexity results on reasoning in presence of terminological cycles for three different 
schema languages under descriptive semantics. In particular, we prove that reasoning 
is polynomial in the basic language, whereas it is intractable for two of its extensions. 
For one of the two extension we identify a syntactic restriction that still allows for 
polynomial reasoning. 
Moreover, we prove that in two systems, namely KRIS, and CONCEPTBASE [ 221, it 
is possible to add a cyclic schema without increasing the complexity of reasoning. As 
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Table 1 
Syntax and semantics of concept forming constructs 
Construct name 
top 
bottom 
singleton set 
intersection 
union 
complement 
universal quantification 
existential quantification 
existential agreement 
number restrictions 
Syntax 
T 
;I 
CflD 
CUD 
4 
VR.C 
3R.C 
3Q g R 
(b nR) 
(< nR) 
A= 
0 
{a=) 
C=nDl 
C=UD= 
A=\@ 
1d1 1 Vd2 : Cdl,&) E R* - dl E C’} 
{dl 1 34 : (dl>d2) E RI A d2 E C=} 
{d113dz:(dl,d2)EQZ.,d,,d2)ERZ} 
{dl 1 Ilid2 I (di.dz) E R’} 2 n} 
{dl / it{‘12 I Cdl.&) E R=} < n} 
Table 2 
Syntax and semantics of role forming constructs 
Construct name Syntax Semantics 
inverse role 
role restriction 
role chain 
role conjunction 
self 
p-1 
(R:C) 
QoR 
QnR 
E 
{(dl,dz) I (dz.d,) E I’=} 
{(dl.dz) I Cdl.&) E R’ Ad2 E CT} 
{(4,4) 1% : (dl.d2) E Qz/l (d2,d3) E Rx} 
{(dlsds) I Cdl.&) E Q= A (dl.d2) E RI} 
((4.4) ) dl E A=} 
byproducts of this result, we also prove that instance checking in KRIS is in PSPACE 
(which was proven by Hollunder [ 181 only for a restricted language). 
In the following section we outline our refined architecture of a TKRS, which com- 
prises three parts: the schema, the view taxonomy, and the world description, dealing 
with primitive concepts, defined concepts and assertions in traditional systems, respec- 
tively. In Section 3 we examine the effect of terminological cycles in our architecture 
and in Section 4, schemas are considered in detail. In Section 5, we show by two case 
studies that adding a simple schema with cycles to existing systems does not increase 
the complexity of reasoning. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
2. The refined architecture 
We start this section by a short reminder on concept languages. Then we discuss the 
form of statements and their semantics in the different components of a TKRS. Finally, 
we specify the reasoning services provided by each component and introduce different 
complexity measures for analyzing them. 
2.1. Concept languages 
In concept languages, complex concepts (ranged over by C, 0) and complex roles 
(ranged over by Q, R) can be built up from simpler ones using concept and role forming 
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constructs (see Tables 1 and 2 for a set of common constructs). The basic syntactic 
symbols are 
(i) concept names, which are divided into schema names (ranged over by A, B) 
and view names (ranged over by V) , 
(ii) role names (ranged over by P), and 
(iii) individual names (or individuals) (ranged over by a, b) . 
An interpretation Z = (A’, .I) consists of the domain AZ and the interpretation function 
.I, which maps every concept to a subset of A’, every role to a subset of A’ x A’, 
and every individual to an element of A’. We assume that different individuals are 
mapped to different elements of A’, i.e., a’ + bz for a # b. This restriction is usually 
called Unique Name Assumption (UNA). Complex concepts and roles are interpreted 
according .to the semantics given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively (with #X we denote the 
cardinality of the set X). We call two concepts C and D equivalent (written C E D), 
iff Cz = DZ for every interpretation 1. A subconcept of a concept C is a substring of 
C that is itself a concept. 
In our architecture, there are two different concept languages in a TKRS, a schema 
language for expressing schema statements and a view language for formulating views 
and queries to the system. Concepts in the schema language contain only schema names 
whereas concepts in the view language may contain both schema and view names. The 
view and schema languages in the case studies will be defined by restricting the set of 
concept and role forming constructs to a subset of those in Tables 1 and 2. 
2.2. The three components 
Now we describe the three parts of a TKRS: the schema, the view taxonomy, and the 
world description. 
2.2.1. The schema 
The schema introduces concept and role names and states isa-relationships between 
concepts and elementary type constraints for the roles. Fig. 1 shows a part of the 
concepts and roles that models the company environment. Concepts are represented by 
ovals, (direct) isa relationships by dotted arrows and roles by normal arrows. 
Formally, relationships between concepts and type constraints on roles are stated by 
inclusion axioms having one of the forms: 
A & L), P 5 AI x AZ, 
where A, Al, A2 are schema names, P is a role name, and D is a concept of the schema 
language (remember that only schema names can appear in the schema language). 
Intuitively, the first axiom, called a concept inclusion, states that all instances of A are 
also instances of D. The second axiom, called a role inclusion, states that the role P has 
domain AI and codomain AZ. A schema S consists of a finite set of inclusion axioms. 
An interpretation Z satisjies an axiom A C: D if AZ c D’, and it satisfies P C Al x A2 
if P’ G AT x AC. The interpretation Z is a model of the schema S if it satisfies all 
axioms in S. Given a schema S and two concepts C, D, we say that C is S-satisjiable 
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Fig. 1. Concepts and roles in the company environment. 
Employee E (= 1 salary) 
Employee g (= 1 lives-in) 
Manager C Employee 
Manager C Vsalary.HighSalary 
Researcher E Employee 
Researcher E Vworks-for.ResearchDept 
Researcher C (2 1 has-degree) 
ResearchDept L Department 
Engineering C Subject 
HighSalary 5 Salary 
salary E Employee x Salary 
boss & Employee x Manager 
works-for C Employee x Department 
lives-in c Employee x City 
has-degree C Researcher x Subject 
situated E Department x City 
Fig. 2. Schema axioms for the company environment. 
if there is a model Z of S such that Cz # 0, and we say that C is S-subsumed by D, 
written C ES D or S k C L D, if Cz C D’ for every model Z of S. 
In Fig. 2 we give the schema axioms for the company example of Fig. 1. The fact 
that the role salary has the domain Employee and the codomain Salary is stated by 
the axiom salary L Employee x Salary. The restriction that an Employee must have 
exactly one salary is expressed by the two axioms Employee C (3 1 salary) and 
Employee C (< 1 salary). 5 The fact that every Manager is an Employee leads to the 
axiom Manager 5 Employee, and that a Manager must have a HighSalary to Manager G 
Vsalary.HighSalary. 6 
’ Two axioms of the form A E (< I P) and A C (2 1 P) are abbreviated by A & (= 1 P). 
‘The introduced syntax for defining a schema is well-suited for studying the theoretical properties of the 
new architecture. However, in a real system one would implement more user-friendly languages as they are 
known from frame systems and object-oriented databases. 
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Inclusion axioms impose only necessary conditions for being an instance of the 
schema na.me on the left-hand side. For example, the axiom “Manager E Employee” 
declares that every manager is an employee, but does not give a sufficient condition 
for being a manager. It gives, though, a sufficient condition for being an employee: 
If an individual is asserted to be a Manager we can deduce that it is an Employee, 
too. 
A schema may contain cycles through inclusion axioms. So one may state that 
the bosses of an employee are themselves employees, writing “Employee ~ Vboss. 
Employee”. In general, existing systems (such as CLASSIC and KRIS) do not allow 
for terminological cycles, which is a serious restriction, since cycles are ubiquitous in 
domain models. One of the main issues related to cycles is to fix their semantics. We 
argue that axioms in the schema have the role of narrowing down the class of models 
we consider possible. Therefore, they should be interpreted under so-called descriptive 
semantics, which takes all models into consideration for reasoning. Nebel [30] pro- 
poses two other kinds of semantics in the presence of cycles, namely least fixpoint 
and greatest fixpoint semantics, which take into account only models that in some 
sense are the least or greatest, respectively. We will discuss this issue in more detail in 
Section 3. 
2.2.2. The view taxonomy 
The view taxonomy contains view dejinitions of the form 
where V is a view name and C is a concept in the view language (remember that both 
schema and view names can appear in view concepts). Views provide abstractions by 
defining ne:w classes of objects in terms of other views and the concept and role names 
introduced in the schema. We refer to “V A C” as the definition of V. The distinction 
between schema and view names is crucial for our architecture. It ensures the separation 
between schema and views. 
A view taxonomy V is a finite set of view definitions such that 
(i) for each view name there is at most one definition, and 
(ii) eac.h view name occurring on the right-hand side of a definition has a definition 
in 11. 
Differently from schema axioms, view definitions give necessary and sufficient con- 
ditions. As an example of a view, using the inverse of boss, one can describe the bosses 
of the employee Bill as the instances of “BillsBosses A 3boss-‘.{BILL}“. 
An interpretation Z satisfies the definition V - C if V’ = C’, and it is a model for a 
view taxonomy V if Z satisfies all definitions in V. 
Whether or not to allow cycles in view definitions is a delicate design decision. 
Differently from the schema, the role of cycles in the view part is to state recursive 
definitions. In this case, descriptive semantics is not adequate because it might not 
determine uniquely the extension of defined concepts from the extension of the other 
ones. We will discuss this problem in general in the section on terminological cycles. 
In this paper however, we only deal with cycle-free view taxonomies. Therefore this 
problem does not arise and descriptive semantics is adequate. 
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2.2.3. The world description 
A state of affairs in the world is described by assertions of the form 
a: c, aRb, 
where C and R are concept and role descriptions in the view language. Intuitively, an 
assertion a: C states that a is an instance of the concept C, and aRb states that LZ is in 
relation with b through the role R. Assertions of the form a: A or aPb, where A and P 
are names in the schema, resemble basic facts in a database. Assertions involving view 
names and complex concepts are comparable to view updates. 
A world description W is a finite set of assertions. The semantics is as usual: an 
interpretation Z satisjes a: C if a’ E C’ and it satisfies aRb if (ar, bz) E Rx; it is a 
model of W if it satisfies every assertion in W. 
Summarizing, a knowledge base is a triple 2 = (S, V, W), where S is a schema, 
V a view taxonomy, and W a world description. An interpretation Z is a model of a 
knowledge base if it is a model of all three components. A knowledge base is satisjiable 
if there exists a model for it. 
2.3. Reasoning services 
There are several reasoning services that a terminological system must provide. We 
concentrate on the following as the basic ones. 
l Schema validation: 
Given a schema S, check whether there exists a model of S that interprets every 
schema name as a nonempty set. 
l Schema subsumption: 
Given a schema S, and schema names Al and AZ, check whether A; C At for 
every model Z of S. This is written as S /= Al C A2 or as Al CS AZ. 
l View subsumption: 
Given a schema S, a view taxonomy V, and view names V, and 6, check whether 
Vl” & V-f for every model Z of S and V. This is written as S, V + VI & V2 or as 
Vl C&V v,. 
l Instance checking: 
Given a knowledge base 2, an individual a, and a view name V, check whether 
uz E VI holds in every model Z of 2’. This is written as 2 k a: V. 
Schema validation and schema subsumption support the knowledge engineer by check- 
ing whether the skeleton of his/her domain model is consistent. Instance checking is the 
basic operation in querying a knowledge base. View subsumption helps in organizing 
and optimizing queries (see e.g., [7] ). Note that the schema S has to be taken into 
account in all services and that the view taxonomy Y is relevant not only for view 
subsumption, but also for instance checking. In systems that forbid cycles, one can get 
rid of S and V by expanding definitions (as shown in [ 291) . This is not possible when 
S and/or V are cyclic. 
Notice that we do not consider the world description for subsumption problems. The 
explanation for this is twofold: First, in most of the languages we consider, the as- 
sertions play no role in determining the subsumption relation (see e.g., [ 29]), and 
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therefore the world description can be neglected in such cases. Second, even in the 
languages in which assertions do affect the subsumption relation (those languages con- 
taining references to individuals e.g., the singleton set constructor) we are interested in 
the static relationship between views, independently of the current state of the world 
description. 
2.4. Comp,!exity measures 
The separation of the core of a TKRS into three components allows us to introduce 
refined complexity measures for analyzing the difficulty of inferences. 
The complexity of a problem is generally measured with respect to the size of the 
whole input. However, with regard to our setting, three different pieces of input are 
given, namely the schema, the view taxonomy, and the world description. For this 
reason, different kinds of complexity measures may be defined, similarly to what has 
been suggested in [ 371 for queries over relational databases. We consider the following 
measures (where 1x1 denotes the size of X): 
l schem.a complexity: the complexity as a function of IS]; 
l view complexity: the complexity as a function of IVI; 
l world description complexity: the complexity as a function of IWI; 
l combined complexity: the complexity as a function of ISI + IV/ + I WI. 
The combined complexity takes into account the whole input. The other three instead 
consider only a part of the input, so they are meaningful only when it is reasonable 
to suppose that the size of the other parts is negligible. For instance, it is sensible 
to analyze the schema complexity of view subsumption because usually the schema is 
much bigger than the two views which are compared. Similarly, one might be interested 
in the world description complexity of instance checking whenever one can expect W 
to be much larger than the schema and the view part. 
It is worth noticing that for every problem the combined complexity, taking into 
account the whole input, is at least as high as the other three. For example, if the 
complexity of a problem is 0( ISI. 15’1. IWl), the combined complexity is cubic, whereas 
the other ones are linear. Similarly, if the complexity of a given problem is 0( IS]lvl), the 
combined complexity and the view complexity are exponential, the schema complexity 
is polynomial, and the world description complexity is constant. 
In this paper, we use combined complexity to compare the complexity of reasoning 
in our architecture with reasoning in the traditional one. Moreover, we use schema 
complexity to show how the presence of a large schema affects the complexity of the 
reasoning services previously defined. View and world description complexity have been 
investigated (under different names) in [ 1,291 and [ 17,321, respectively. 
For a general description of the complexity classes we use, see [ 231. 
3. Terminological cycles 
Terminologies with cycles-so-called “terminological cycles”-have been investigated 
by a number of researchers. There are two main issues related to terminological cycles: 
The first is to fix the semantics and the second, based on this, to come up with a proper 
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inference procedure. In this section we discuss in detail the problem of semantics. To 
this end, we first recall some definitions and then summarize the previous work on this 
topic, Then we examine the different possibilities of a semantics for our formalism. It 
shows up that our choice, the descriptive semantics, comes off best. The problem of 
inferences and the influence of the different kinds of cycles to their complexity are dealt 
with in Sections 4 and 5. 
3.1. Semantics for cycles 
Intuitively, a set of inclusions or definitions is cyclic, if a concept name appearing 
on the left-hand side also appears on the right-hand side. In the following, we formally 
define when a terminology, schema or view taxonomy is cyclic. Then we review various 
kinds of semantics for cycles. For the moment we suppose that a schema consists only 
of concept inclusions. In Section 4 we extend this to role inclusions. There we also 
distinguish between different types of cycles and their effects on the complexity of 
inferences for concrete schema languages. 
Let 7 be a terminology consisting of concept inclusions and view definitions where 
for each view name there is at most one definition. We define the dependency graph 
D(7) of 7 as follows. The nodes are the concept names in 7. Let AI, A2 be two nodes. 
There is an edge from A, to AZ, iff there is a concept inclusion or a view definition 
with Al on its left-hand side and A2 appearing on its right-hand side. We say 7 is 
cyclic, if D( 7) contains a cycle, and cycle-free otherwise. Let 2 = (S, V, W) be a 
knowledge base. We say S is cyclic, if D(S) contains a cycle. We say 1, is cyclic, if 
D(V) contains a cycle. Note that, since view names are not allowed in the schema, 
D (S u V) contains a cycle if and only if either D(S) or D(V) contains one. 
To come up with a semantics for a terminology means to define which of its models 
should be considered for reasoning. Let us concentrate on definitions and let 7 be a 
set of concept definitions, 7 := {A; G C; 1 i E l..n}, where each A; occurs only once 
as the left-hand side of a definition, i.e., A; # Al for i # j. The concept names that 
occur on the left-hand side of a view definition are called defbzed concepts, the other 
ones are called atomic concepts. All role names are atomic roles, since there are no role 
definitions. 
The problem when cycles are present is that an interpretation of the atomic concepts 
might be extendible to a model of the terminology in more than one way (see e.g., 
[ 281) . Therefore, the defined concepts are not uniquely determined by the atomic ones. 
This is counterintuitive to the idea of a “definition”. So one has to restrict the models 
taken into account. Nebel [28] proposes three types of semantics for a terminology in 
the presence of cycles: descriptive semantics, least &point semantics (@semantics), 
and greatest jixpoint semantics (&p-semantics). The descriptive semantics takes into 
account-as usual first-order semantics-all models of a terminology. The lfp- and 
gfp-semantics take into account only those models that are in some sense minimal or 
maximal. To make this idea more precise, we need some definitions. 
An atomic interpretation 3 of 7 interprets only the atomic concepts and roles in 7. 
An atomic interpretation J can be extended to an interpretation of 7 by defining the 
denotation of the Ai’s. Note that not every extension of 3 is a model of 7. 
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Let J be an atomic interpretation of ‘7 with domain A. Let 2’ denote the set of 
all subsets of A and (2’)” the n-fold Cartesian product of 2’. We define a mapping 
‘7$ (2”)” + (2’)” by 
7$-(O) := (c&...,c:>, 
whereO:==(Oi,..., 0,) and 7 is the extension of 3 defined by AZ := Oi for i E l..n. 
A fixpoint of 73 is an 0 E ( 2A)n such that 7~ (0) = 0. Obviously, the interpretation 
defined by J and 0 is a model of 7 if and only if 0 is a fixpoint of 73. 
A mapping T: D -+ D on a complete lattice (D, 6) is called monotonic if a < b 
implies T(a) < T(b) for all a, b E D. Every monotonic mapping on a complete lattice 
has a fixpoint. Among the fixpoints there is a greatest&point and a leastfipoint (see 
e.g., [25, Chapter 1, Section 51). Let “G” be the componentwise subset ordering on 
(2”)“. Since ((2”)“, 6) is a complete lattice, every monotonic mapping 7~ has a 
greatest and a least fixpoint. There exist simple syntactic criteria on terminologies which 
guarantee Ithat, for a given 7, all 73 are monotonic for all J (see e.g., [ 351). We say 
that a terminology 7 is monotonic if the 7~ are monotonic for all 3. 
For a set of concept definitions 7 the gfp-semantics takes into account only those 
models of 7 that are the greatest fixpoint of some mapping 73 (gfp-models). The 
lfp-semantics takes into account only those models of 7 that are the least fixpoint of 
some mapping 73 (lfp-models). 
3.2. Previous work 
There exists a rich body of research on the semantics of terminological cycles and on 
algorithms for reasoning in their presence. 
In [ 1 ] inferences with respect to the three types of semantics for the language 
3L0, containing concept conjunction and universal quantification, are characterized as 
decision problems for finite automata. Baader argues that “as it stands, the gfp-semantics 
comes off best” (see [ 1, p. 6261) . In [ 301 these characterizations are extended to the 
language TLN, which extends 3Lc by number restrictions. Nebel argues that “the only 
semantics, which covers our intuitions is the descriptive one” (see [ 28, p. 1351) . In both 
languages, the presence of cycles increases the complexity of reasoning. For example, 
the complexity of subsumption with respect to a terminology rises from NP-complete 
to PSPACE-complete for lfp- and gfp-semantics. 
Dionne, Mays and Oles [ 12,131 base their approach to the semantics of cycles 
on non-well-founded set theory. They consider a limited language for which they 
show that subsumption under their semantics is equivalent to subsumption under gfp- 
semantics. 
Reasoning with respect to descriptive semantics has been considered in [2] for the 
language ,4LC and in [6] for ALCNI?. The language ALC extends .FLo by comple- 
ments of concepts and ALCNR extends dLC by role conjunction and number restric- 
ti0ns.l ALCNR is the language of the system KRIS. For both dLC and ALCNI?. 
‘See Section 5.1 for a formal definition of the two languages. 
220 M. Buchheit et al. /Artificial Intelligence 99 (1998) 209-260 
subsumption checking with cyclic definitions is EXPTIME-hard (for ACC it has been 
proven EXPTIME-complete) , whereas the problem is PSPACE-complete for cycle-free 
terminologies. 
An approach based on the ~-calculus was proposed independently by Schild [35] 
and De Giacomo and Lenzerini [ 111. Following this approach it is possible to specify 
locally in a terminology whether to apply lfp- or gfp-semantics to a particular definition. 
This offers optimal flexibility but it leaves the burden of choice to the user and not to 
the designer of the system. 
Summarizing, one can say that the presence of terminological cycles increases the 
complexity of reasoning in the examined cases. No consensus has been reached as to 
which semantics-lfp-, gfp-, or descriptive-should be preferred. 
3.3. Inclusions versus dejinitions 
In order to apply the different kinds of semantics to our schema formalism and to 
examine the consequences, we have to transform inclusions into definitions, since fix- 
point semantics is defined only for sets of definitions. Nebel [ 281 proposes to transform 
an inclusion A L C into a definition A A A fl C where A is a new concept name. 
Schild [ 351 proposes the transformation into A A A fl C. However, both transformations 
are unsatisfactory or even unnecessary for schema inclusions as we will show in the 
following. 
Let S = {A; C C; 1 i E 1 ..n} be a set of inclusion axioms. Without loss of generality, 
we suppose that each A; occurs only once on the left-hand side, since inclusions A C 
DI, . , A C D, can be replaced by the single inclusion A L DI fl . . . n D,. 
With s we denote the transformation proposed by Nebel, with S” the one proposed 
by Schild, and with S= the one that replaces the inclusions by definitions, that is, 
l S := {A; - Ai n Ci 1 i E l..n}, 
l S” := {A; - A; n C; 1 i E l..n}, 
l S=:={Ai-C; liE l..n}. 
Obviously, every model of $, S”, or S= is also a model of S. 
Now we consider in turn the different combinations of lfp- and gfp-semantics and the 
two transformations of Nebel and Schild. Taking lfp-semantics has for both transforma- 
tions the consequence that naturally arising models are omitted. Obviously, an lfp-model 
of S” interprets each Ai as the empty set, independently of the interpretation of the Ci. 
In order to examine the transformation s, we consider an example. Let S be the schema 
S = {A C: V’P.A}. The lfp-models of s = {A k A n VP.A} can be characterized in 
terms of P-chains. A P-chain is a sequence of objects where each one is a P-filler of 
its predecessor. An lfp-model of 3 interprets A as all the instances of A for which all 
the objects reachable by a P-chain are again in A and from which no infinite P-chain is 
issuing (see [ 1 ] ) . This means that models containing a cyclic P-chain are omitted. For 
example, with the schema S = {Employee C Vis-deputy-of.Employee} and the world 
description where JOE is-deputy-of MARY and MARY is-deputy-of JOE, with the lfp- 
semantics, JOE and MARY cannot be Employees. Notice however that this is a problem 
of lfp-semantics in general, and not one of the specific transformation only and it shows 
that the approach of taking lfp-semantics is not acceptable in this situation. 
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Before we consider the combinations of gfp-semantics with the two transformations, 
we have to introduce some notations. Let T: D 3 D be a mapping on a complete lattice 
(D, 6). With gfp(T) we denote the greatest fixpoint of T. Let X be a subset of D. 
With l&X we denote the least upper bound of X. The next result is a weak form of 
the Proposition 5.1 in [ 251. 
Proposition 3.1. Let T: D + D be a monotonic mapping on the complete lattice 
(D, 6). Then gfp(T) = lub{x 1 x 6 T(x)}. 
The following proposition, due to Schild [ 341, shows that for a large class of schemas, 
S” and S= are equivalent under gfp-semantics. 
Proposition 3.2. Let S be a set of inclusion axioms. Suppose that S= is monotonic. 
Then an interpretation Z is a &&model of S” iff Z is a tip-model of F. 
Proof. First, notice that if S= is monotonic then S” is monotonic. In fact, let S = 
{A; L Ci 1 i E 1 ..n} and Zi and ZZ two interpretations such that AT C A? for i E 
l..n. If S= is monotonic then C,?’ 2 Cp f or i E l..n. From the two set inclusions 
A? 2 A? and CIF1 C C,?, it follows that A? n C,? & A? rl ClF2, proving that S” is 
monotonic. 
Let Z = (A, .‘) be an interpretation and ,7 the corresponding atomic interpretation, 
i.e., the restriction of Z to the atomic concepts and roles of S. Remember that ( (24)“, <) 
is a complete lattice. With Cz we denote the vector (Cf, . . . , C,“) and with “A” the 
componentwise intersection on (24)‘, Then the following holds: 
gfp(ST) = lub{U 1 0 < S?(O)} (1) 
=zub{O~O<OAC=} (2) 
= lub{O 1 0 < C=} (3) 
= lub{U I 0 6 S;(O)} (4) 
=gfp(s;). (5) 
Eqs. ( 1) and (5) follow from the monotonicity of S” and S= and from Proposition 3.1, 
Eq. (2) and (4) follow by definition of the mappings Sy and S>, respectively, and 
Eq. (3) is based on a well-known result from set theory, i.e., A C B if and only if 
AcAnB. 0 
As a consequence of the preceding proposition, taking the transformation of Schild to- 
gether with gfp-semantics forces all schema concepts with the same frame-like structure 
to be identical. For example, if the schema is 
S = {Horse E Vchild.Horse, Human C Vchild.Human}, 
horses and humans would be equivalent under gfp-semantics. 
Next we consider the transformation S. We show that the descriptive models of S 
and the gfp-models of S correspond to each other in the sense that 
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( 1) every gfp-model of S is a descriptive model of S and 
(2) every descriptive model of S can be turned into a gfp-model of S by choosing 
the denotation of the additional atomic concepts Ai in a suitable manner. 
The first point is obvious. To see the second point, for an interpretation Z of S let z 
denote the interpretation of S defined by A’ := A’ and Pz := P’ for every concept 
name A and role name P appearing in S and A;’ := AZ for i E 1.~. Then the following 
holds. 
Proposition 3.3. Let Z be a model of S. Then z is a &p-model of s. 
Proof. Let 2 denote the atomic interpretation corresponding to r. We first show that 
(A?,. . . , AZ) is a fixpoint of ST. To this end we have to show that AT = (Ai n C;)’ 
for i E 1 ..n. By definition of z this is equivalent to AZ = AZ n Cl? for i E 1.~. The 
inclusions A’ > AZ n C,? hold trivially. For the inclusions Al G AI fl C,? it remains 
to show that A’ & C,? for i E 1.~. But this follows from the fact that Z is a model of 
S = {Ai & Ci 1 i E l..n}. 
In order to see that z is a gfp-model observe that for every fixpoint model Z* 
extending 3 it holds that A’* = Aa f’Y C” and therefore A’* G AT. But by definition 
of z we have AT = $ = AT = AT. That is, AZ* G AT. Hence, Z* is a smaller fixpoint 
than 2. 0 
Hence taking the transformation of Nebel has the consequence that descriptive se- 
mantics and gfp-semantics coincide, i.e., every conclusion with respect to descriptive 
semantics is also a conclusion with respect to gfp-semantics and vice versa. But this 
means that making that transformation and then providing a mechanism for reasoning 
with respect to gfp-semantics is just a detour of reasoning with respect to descriptive 
semantics. 
The following theorem summarizes our results on gfp-semantics for the transforma- 
tions proposed by Nebel and Schild. 
Theorem 3.4. Let S be a set of inclusion axioms and Al, A2 two schema names. 
(i) If S= is monotonic, then S” and S= are equivalent under &p-semantics. 
(ii) S k Al & A2 under g&-semantics if and only if S k Al r A2 under descriptive 
semantics. 
In conclusion, one can say that adopting lfp- or gfp-semantics for our schema formal- 
ism leads either to unacceptable results or is equivalent to descriptive semantics. This 
gives additional evidence for our choice to take descriptive semantics for the schema. 
3.4. Schema cycles versus view cycles 
We feel that much of the confusion about the semantics of terminological cycles and 
many computational problems stem from the mixing of inclusions and definitions. There- 
fore we propose to make a distinction between the schema, containing only inclusions, 
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and the vifew taxonomy containing only definitions. These two parts also differ with 
respect to the concept language and the type of semantics. The axioms in the schema 
have the role of narrowing down the class of models we consider possible. Therefore, 
they should be interpreted under descriptive semantics. Also the results presented in this 
section support this choice. 
Differently from the schema, the role of cycles in the view part is to state recursive def- 
initions. For example, if we want to describe the group of individuals that are above Bill 
in the hierarchy of bosses we can use the definitions “BillsBosses A Iboss-‘.{BILL}” 
and “BillsSuperBosses - BillsBossesUZlboss-‘.BillsSuperBosses”. But as argued before, 
in general this does not yield a definition if we assume descriptive semantics. For a 
fixed interpretation of BILL and the role boss there may be several ways to interpret 
BillsSuperBosses in such a way that the above equality holds. In this example, we only 
obtain the intended meaning if we assume lfp-semantics. Unfortunately, algorithms for 
subsumption of views under such semantics are known only for fragments of the concept 
language defined in Tables 1 and 2. 
In this paper, we only deal with cycle-free view taxonomies. In this case all the three 
types of semantics coincide. 
4. Schemas 
The schema introduces the concepts and roles of the domain to be modeled and 
describes their relationships. In this section we first introduce the concept language SE. 
In SC, we can express the statements most frequently occurring in the declaration of 
primitive concepts in terminological systems and in the static parts of object-oriented 
database schemas. Then we investigate two extensions of SC the language S&,, where 
one can state that two classes are disjoint, and S&v, which allows for statements about 
inverse attributes. We show that reasoning about SC-schemas is easy, while it is hard 
for the two extensions. The language SL will also be used in Section 5 as the schema 
language in our case studies. 
4.1. SC-schemas 
A schema does not contain definitions, but imposes only necessary conditions on 
concepts and roles, which are expressed by inclusion axioms. 
Basic schema information can be captured if we choose the concept language SC, 
introduced in 171, which is defined by the syntax rule 
D - A 1 VP.A 1 (2 1 P) ( (< 1 P). 
As shown in Section 2, by such schemas we can express elementary type information like 
domain and1 codomain of roles, inclusion relationships, and restrictions of the codomain 
of a role due to restrictions of its domain. Moreover, we can specify a role as necessary 
(at least one value) or single valued (at most one value). An SC-schema is a set of 
inclusion axioms where all concepts are from SC. 
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The basic reasoning task for schemas is to determine validity. For SL-schemas, this 
is trivial. 
Proposition 4.1. Every SL-schema is valid. 
Proof. For a given SC-schema S we construct an interpretation Z = (A’, .‘) as follows. 
Let dz be the set of individuals in our language (we assume that there is at least one). 
For any concept name A, role name P and individual a we define AZ := A’, P’ := 
{(a,a) 1 a E A’}, and a’ := a. It is easy to check that Z satisfies every axiom in S and 
that A’ # 0 for every concept name A. •i 
It is also interesting to determine the subsumption relations between schema names 
that are entailed by a schema. For a schema S, we write A 3s B if there are schema 
names A= Ao,Al..., A, = B such that S contains the axioms Ai- & A; for i E 1.~ 
In other words, “5s” is the transitive, reflexive closure of the explicit subsumption 
statements in S. 
An SC-schema may entail non-obvious subsumptions. For example, from the schema 
{salary & Person x Salary, Employee C (2 1 salary)} 
it follows that every employee is a person. 
We will call a schema S isa-complete if all implicit subsumption relations of this 
kind already follow from the statements about inclusions, i.e., if Ai 3s AZ, whenever 
S contains axioms P C A2 x B and Al 5 (2 1 P). Obviously, verifying whether a 
schema is isa-complete takes polynomial time. Moreover, an arbitrary schema can be 
transformed in polynomial time into an equivalent schema that is isa-complete. * 
General assumption. In the rest of the section we assume that all schemas are isa- 
complete. 
Proposition 4.2. Let S be an isa-complete SC-schema and A, B be schema names. 
Then A & B if and only if A 5s B. 
Proof. This is a consequence of Proposition 4.15. q 
We conclude that subsumption of schema names with respect to an SC-schema can 
be computed in polynomial time. 
4.2. Schemas with disjointness axioms 
In many modeling tasks one would like to state that certain classes are disjoint. Con- 
sidering the company environment in Fig. 2, one might want to require employees, cities, 
departments, etc., not to have common instances. This can be achieved by disjointness 
axioms of the form 
’ Two sets of axioms are equivalent if they have the same models. 
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The schema language obtained from S_L by adding negation of concept names TB is 
called SL<\is. 
In contrast to SL, not every S&,-schema is valid. We say that a schema S is locally 
valid if for every schema name there is some model of S where it is interpreted as 
a nonempty set. The following proposition says that validity of S&i,-schemas can be 
decided by considering one concept at a time. 
Proposition 4.3. An SL,g,-schema is valid if and only if it is locally valid. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
4.2.1. Validity of SLdi,-schemas is co-NP-hard 
We show that deciding the validity of SLdi,-schemas is co-NP-hard. The proof consists 
in a reductj on of the satisfiability problem for concepts of the language AL& (see [ 361)) 
which is defined by the syntax rule 
C,C’- _LjTIAI~AICnC’IVP.Cj3P.C. 
In [ 141 it has been shown that deciding satisfiability of ALE-concepts is co-NP- 
complete. The intuitive reason for this result is that for an unsatisfiable concept there 
always exists an unsatisfiability proof of polynomial length. However, the interaction of 
universal and existential quantifiers may generate an exponential number of Skolem con- 
stants, which results in an exponential number of deductions that have to be considered 
during the search for a proof. 
The proof in [ 141 reveals, more specifically, that satisfiability is still co-NP-complete 
for restricted AC&-concepts C, which satisfy the following properties: 
(i) only one role symbol occurs in C; 
(ii) no concept name other than T and I occurs in C; 
(iii) there is exactly one occurrence of I in C; 
(iv) every proper subconcept of C distinct from I is satisfiable. 
A subconcept is proper if it is a proper substring. The condition that no proper subconcept 
other than _L is unsatisfiable implies that a restricted concept has no subconcept of the 
form 3P.I or _L F’ D. 
Our proof consists in associating to every restricted ALE-concept C an SLdi,-schema 
SC such that SC is valid if and only if C is satisfiable. 
Construction 4.4. Let C be a restricted AL&-concept whose only role symbol is Q. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that C # 1. The assumptions imply that C has 
exactly one subconcept of the form VQ._L. We choose for each subconcept D # _L of 
C a concept name AD and for every subconcept D = 3Q.D’ a role symbol PD. Let 
?c be the set of all such role symbols. Let A +, A- be two additional concept names. 
Then we enter into the schema SC the axiom A+ C TA-, and furthermore, for every 
subconcept D of C the following axioms: 
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(1) AD 5 ADI, AD & AD,,, if D = D’ n D”; 
(2) AD & (3 1 Pn), Ao L VP~.AD/, if D = 3Q.D’; 
(3) AD g VP.AD~ for all P E PC, if D = VQ.0’ with D’ # I; 
(4) AD 5 VP.A+, AD 5 ‘dP.A-, for all P E PC, if D = VQ..l_. 
The idea underlying our reduction is to “unfold” the concept C into a set of axioms. 
In this process, conceptually the role Q is imitated by the union of all P E PC, 
universally quantified subconcepts of C are translated into universal quantification over 
all roles P E PC, and existentially quantified subconcepts D are translated into an 
existential quantification over the role PD. Thus, the reduction shows that, as in reasoning 
about ALE-concepts, the interplay between universal and existential quantifiers makes 
inferences about S&i,-SChemaS difficult. 
Lemma 4.5. Let C be a restricted d&Z-concept. Then SC is valid if and only if C is 
satisfiable. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
Theorem 4.6. Validity of S&i,-schemas is co-NP-hard. 
4.2.2. An algorithm for reasoning about S&i,-schemas 
Next we describe an algorithm for deciding the local validity of an S&,-schema 
S. Actually, it is a method to check whether a finite conjunction of schema names is 
S-satisfiable. From it we can derive as an upper complexity bound that validity can be 
decided with polynomial space for arbitrary schemas. 
Our method consists in constructing for every schema S a labeled directed graph 0~ 
such that the validity of S can be decided by traversing Gs. The size of & is exponential 
in the size of S, and the portion of G’s to be explored might also be exponential in 
the size of S. We obtain our PSPACE result by keeping only a small portion of Gs in 
memory at a time. 
Let P be a role symbol. We say that P is necessary on A if there is an A’ with 
A 5s A’ and A’ 5 (2 1 P) E S. If P is necessary on A then in any model of S every 
instance of A has a P-filler. 
We say that S contains a P-transition from A to B (written AAsB) if there is an 
At with A 5s A’ and A’ C VP.B E S or if there is a role inclusion P C A” x B E S. 
Note that if P is necessary on A then, since S is isa-complete, it holds that A 5~ A”. If 
there is a P-transition from A to B, then in any model of S every P-filler of an instance 
of A is an instance of B. 
If C is a set of concept names occurring in S we define the range of P on C as the 
set 
range( P, C) := {B ( A LsB for some A E C}. 
Construction 4.7. For an S&,-Schema S the schema graph $7~ is defined as fol- 
lows: 
l every set C of concept names occurring in S is a node of Gs; 
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l there is an edge with label P from C to C’ if 
l P is necessary on A for some A E C, and 
0 C’== range(P,C). 
A node C is a conf7ict node if there are A, B E C such that A’ 5 7Bf E S for some 
A’, B’ with A 3s A’ and B 5s B’. 
Intuitively, a node C = {Al, . . . , A,} represents the assumption that Al ,. . .,A,,, have 
a common instance. A conflict node stands for an assumption that contradicts some 
disjointness axiom in S. If there is an edge with label P from C to C’ = {BI , . . . , B,}, 
then every common instance of Al,. . . , A, has a P-filler (because P is necessary on 
some Ai), which is a common instance of Bl , . . . , B, (because C’ is the range of P on 
C) . The set C’ might be the empty set. But then there is no edge going out of C’, since a 
role P can be necessary only on concepts. The graph Gs will be used to check whether 
the assumption that Al, . . . , A,,, have a common instance leads to a contradiction. 
Lemma 4.8. Let S be an isa-complete S&,-schema and C = {Al,. . . , A,,}. Then 
A, r-I... n A,,, is S-unsatis$able if and only if there is a path in &from C to a conflict 
node. 
Proof. See the Appendix. q 
By Lemma 4.8, A1 n . .. n A,, is not S-satisfiable if and only if there is a path in 
G.s from C = {Al,... , A,,} to some conflict node C’. Such a path can be detected 
nondeterministically as follows: for a given node we construct a sequence of successor 
nodes until we have reached a conflict node. A successor node can be computed if 
the current node and the schema are known. Both can be stored using no more than 
polynomial space. Thus, there exists a nondeterministic polynomial space algorithm. By 
Savitch’s Theorem (see [ 21]), it can be transformed into a deterministic polynomial 
space algorithm. This proves the following theorem: 
Theorem 41.9. There is a PSPACE algorithm that decides for an S.&,-schema S and 
schema names Al, . . . , A,,, whether the conjunction Al n + . . n A, is S-satis$able. 
Combining Theorem 4.9 with the preceding hardness result leads to the following 
complexity bounds. 
Corollary ~1.10. The validity problem for S.&i,-schemes is in PSPACE and co-NP-hard. 
4.2.3. Cycles in S&,-schemas 
In Section 3 we introduced a general notion of terminological cycles for arbitrary 
schemas without role inclusions. In this section we refine this notion for S.&,-schemas 
and adopt it also to role inclusions. Then we identify a class of cycles that increases the 
complexity of reasoning about S&i,-SCheltlaS. To this end, we extend the dependency 
graph in two directions. First, we add edges coming from role inclusions and second, 
we mark the edges in order to classify the cycles. 
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Role inclusions may give rise to terminological cycles. To see this, note that an axiom 
oftheformPCAr xA2isequivalenttothetwoaxioms(> 1P) LA~,TEVP.AZ.~ 
Thus, a role inclusion P C Al x A2 leads to two kinds of additional edges. There is 
an edge from A to A:! for every concept name A, since A & T and T 5 VP.A2 hold. 
There is also an edge from A to Al for every axiom A L (2 1 P), since (3 1 P) C A1 
holds. 
We want to distinguish between different classes of cycles and clarify their influence 
on the complexity of inferences. Some cycles are computationally harmless. For example, 
the schema S = {AI L AZ, A2 _C A I } is cyclic, but in every model of S, Al and A2 
denote the same set. One can get rid of A 1, say, while keeping essentially the same 
meaning. We extend the definition of the dependency graph by using labeled edges. The 
label indicates the kind of axiom the edge comes from. 
Let S be an S&,-schema. We redefine the dependency graph D(S) of S as follows. 
The nodes are the concept names in S. Let Al, AZ be two nodes. There is 
l an k-edge from Al to A2 if there is an axiom AI 5 A2 in S; 
l a some-edge from AI to A2 if there are axioms AI C: (2 1 P) and P 5 A2 x A3 
in S; 
l an all-edge from Al to A2 if there is an axiom AI L YP.A2 in S or if there is an 
axiom P & A x A2 in S; 
l a neg-edge from Al to A2 if there is an axiom Al L ?A2 in S. 
Since schemas are assumed to be isa-complete, there is always a sequence of isa- 
edges from Al to A2 if there is a some-edge from Al to AZ. We say S is cyclic, if 
D(S) contains a cycle, and cycle-free otherwise. An all-cycle is a cycle which contains 
at least one all-edge and no neg-edge. A schema S is all-cycle-free, if D(S) contains 
no all-cycle. 
So the all-cycle-free schemas are a subset of all schemas and the cycle-free schemas 
are a subset of the all-cycle-free schemas. Now we want to determine the complexity of 
reasoning for these subclasses. 
Notice that the schema built by Construction 4.4 is always cycle-free. This leads to 
the following lower bound for validity checking. 
Theorem 4.11. Validity of cycle-free S&s-schemes is co-NP-hard. 
Now we turn to the upper bound. First notice the correspondence between all-cycles 
and cyclic chains of P-transitions. 
Proposition 4.12. A schema S contains an all-cycle iff there is a sequence of transitions 
AoasAI,. . . , AkASAO. 
Thus, if Co, Cl,. . . , C, is a path in the schema graph & of an all-cycle-free schema 
S, then any two distinct sets C’;, Cj on the path are disjoint. Therefore, the length of 
paths in GS is bounded linearly by the number of names occurring in S. Thus, the non- 
’ An interpretation Z satisfies an arbitrary inclusion C C D if CT c D’. 
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deterministic algorithm of Section 4.2.2 that follows a path issuing from {Al, . . . , Am} 
until it reaches a conflict node can be run in polynomial time. This gives the following 
result. 
Theorem 41.13. Let S be an all-cycle-free S&,-Schema. Then deciding whether a con- 
junction A1 n. . enAn, of schema names is S-unsatisfiable can be done in nondeterministic 
polynomial time. 
Combining this theorem with the hardness result of Theorem 4.6 leads to the following 
complexity bound. 
Corollary 4.14. The validity problem for all-cycle-free S&i,-schemas is co-NP-com- 
plete. 
4.2.4. Subsumption in S&s 
Deciding subsumption of schema names with respect to an S&,-Schema S cannot 
be easier than checking unsatisfiability: Al r”l. . . fl A,, is S-unsatisfiable iff for any name 
B not occurring in S we have At n . . . fl A,, Cs B. The following proposition shows 
that the difficulty of subsumption checking stems solely from the difficulty of checking 
satisfiability and that for satisfiable concepts S-subsumption is captured completely by 
the relation “3~“. 
Proposition 4.15. Let S be an isa-complete S&i,-SChWUl and A, Al,. . . , A,,,, be 
schema names. Suppose that Al n . . . n A,,, is S-satis$able. Then Al n.. . n A,,, & A if 
and only if there is an Ai such that Ai -& A. 
Proof. Obviously, if Ai 5s A, then Ai & A and thus Al n . . . fl A,, Es A. 
If A1 n. x + n A, is S-satisfiable, then the interpretation Z constructed in the proof of 
Lemma 4.8 is a model of S with C := {Al, . . . , A,,} E A: n . . . n A;. If there is no Ai 
with Ai js A, then C 4 A’. Hence, Al fl. . . n A, is not S-subsumed by A. q 
Corollary 4.16. Subsumption of conjunctions of schema names with respect to S&is- 
schemas is NP-hard. For arbitrary SLd,-schemas this problem can be decided using 
polynomial space. For all-cycle free S&i,-SChemUS, there is a nondeterministic polyno- 
mial time algorithm. 
Proof. NP-hardness holds because unsatisfiability of schema names with respect to 
S.&i,-SChenlaS is co-NP-hard (see Construction 4.4 and Lemma 4.5). 
An algorithm can decide whether Al n. . . n A,, is subsumed by BI n + . . n B, by first 
checking whether A1 n . . . n A, is S-unsatisfiable. If so, it returns “yes”, Otherwise, 
it checks whether for every Bj there is an Ai such that Ai 3s Bj. Clearly, the second 
check can be in polynomial time. Now, the upper bounds follow from the upper bounds 
for checking S-satisfiability. q 
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4.25 Dichotomic schemas 
We now investigate a restricted class of S&i,-Schemas that allow for polynomial time 
reasoning. We facilitate our presentation by assuming that schemas come in a normal 
form. 
A schema S is normal if for every P occurring in S we have: 
l S contains exactly one axiom of the form P 5 A x B; 
l if either A’ ‘& (2 1 P) E S, or A’ C (6 1 P) E S, or A’ C VP.B’ E S, then 
A’ _is A and B’ 5s B. 
In normal schemas, the domain and codomain of a role P have a unique name in the 
schema. We denote them as dom( P) and cod(P), respectively. Moreover, statements 
about P only involve concepts that are S-subsumed by the domain or codomain of P. 
A normal S~~~,-SChUlM S is dichotomic if for every role P we have that S contains 
at most one axiom of the form A G (3 1 P), and if so, then A = dom( P). Dichotomic 
schemas owe their name to the fact that a role is either necessary on its entire domain 
or it is not necessary for any concept. Thus, in such a schema, the interaction between 
universal and existential quantification over roles is limited. 
Practical schemas are mostly normal and often also dichotomic. For example, schemas 
of object-oriented databases usually enforce implicitly this property by distinguishing 
between set-valued and other attributes. For a set-valued attribute, the set of fillers may 
be empty, while other attributes always have exactly one filler. The latter correspond to 
necessary, the former to non-necessary roles. 
We show that for dichotomic schemas validity can be decided in polynomial time. 
For any dichotomic schema S we construct a directed graph YDs such that it suffices to 
inspect ?2s in order to decide the satisfiability of concepts. In contrast to Gs, the size 
of DS is polynomial in the size of S. 
Construction 4.17. For every S&i,-SChf3lla S the dichotomic schema graph DS is 
defined as follows: 
l the nodes are sets {A, B} consisting of one or two concept names occurring in S 
(note that A, B need not be distinct) ; 
l there is an edge with label P from (A, B} to {A’, B’} if 
l P is necessary on dom( P), 
l ALsA’ and BLsB’, and 
l A, B 3s dam(P) 
(note that this definition also captures the case that A = B or A’ = B’). 
A node {A, B} is a confiict node if there are A’, B’ with A 3s A’, B 5s B’ such that 
A’ C 7B’ E S. 
The intuition underlying DS is similar to the one that led to !&. For arbitrary Scdi,- 
schemas, however, we had to take into account arbitrarily big sets of schema names, 
while for dichotomic schemas we can concentrate on sets with at most two elements. 
Lemma 4.18. Let S be a dichotomic schema and Al,. . . , A,, be concept names. A 
conflict node in & is reachable from {A 1, . . . , A,,) if and only if there are Ai, Aj such 
that a conflict node in Vs is reachable from {Ai, Aj}. 
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Proof. See: the Appendix. Cl 
Corollary 4.19. Let S be a dichotomic schema and Al,. . . , A,,, be concept names. Then 
the following are equivalent: 
(i) Al n ... n A,, is not S-satisfiable; 
(ii) there are A;, Aj such that Ai n A,i is not S-satisfiable; 
(iii) there are Ai, Aj such that a conflict node in Vs is reachable from {Ai, Aj}. 
Corollary 4.20. For dichotomic schemas, satisfiability and subsumption of conjunctions 
of concept names can be decided in polynomial time. 
4.2.6. Related work 
Theorem 3.4 tells us that subsumption with respect to to a schema S, that is a 
set of inclusion axioms, under descriptive semantics can be reduced to subsumption 
with respect to to the set of definitions S under greatest fixpoint semantics. Baader 
[ 11 and Nebel [29,30] have investigated the subsumption problem with respect to 
sets of-possibly cyclic-concept definitions under various semantics, among them gfp- 
semantics, They determined the complexity of subsumption and developed algorithms. 
This could suggest to make use of their techniques to reason about schemas. 
In addition, their technical approach looks similar to ours. They reduce the subsump- 
tion problelm under gfp-semantics to inclusion problems for regular languages. To do so, 
they construct for a given set of definitions a nondeterministic automaton where the states 
are the names of concepts and where the transitions between states are marked with role 
symbols. The regular languages in question are defined in terms of the automaton. 
The automaton contains a cycle if and only if the terminology contains a cycle. 
By a translation of well-known results from automata theory, this yields PSPACE- 
completeness of subsumption in general terminologies and co-NP-completeness in the 
case of acyclic terminologies. 
At first glance, the method strongly resembles ours. Evidently, automata can be viewed 
as directed graphs with labeled arcs. In particular, constructing a deterministic out of a 
nondeterministic automaton by the powerset technique is very similar to constructing a 
schema graph out of a schema. 
However, it turns out that the languages for which Baader and Nebel give algorithms 
are virtually subsets of SC. Also, they do not consider role inclusions as we do. 
While reasoning problems for schemas become difficult when disjointness is added to 
SC, reasoning about SL-schemas is almost trivial: schema names and conjunctions of 
schema names are always satisfiable, and all subsumption relations can be derived by 
transitivity from those given explicitly. This is different if inclusions are replaced by 
definitions: reasoning is costly already for very limited languages. 
A further difference is that in the present work the connection between schemas and 
automata is not so straightforward as in the work by Baader and Nebel. In their case, 
concepts of the form (3 1 P) do not have a particular impact on subsumption: 
(i) the subsumption problem is not any more difficult for schemas where such 
concepts occur than it is for schemas without, and the algorithms are essentially 
the same; 
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(ii) only concepts of the form VP.B are relevant for the existence of transitions in 
their automata. 
In SC,+_-schemas, instead, the interplay between existential quantification in expres- 
sions (3 1 P) and universal quantification in expressions VP.B is the primary source of 
complexity. It is not too difficult to see that for schemas that either contain no inclusion 
of the type A L (2 1 P) or no inclusion of the form A E ‘dP.B satisfiability and 
subsumption are polynomial. 
Finally, the complexity results look similar but, in fact, are different. For acyclic 
schemas, we have shown that unsatisfiability-and therefore subsumption-is NP-com- 
plete. For acyclic terminologies, Baader and Nebel have shown that subsumption is 
co-NP-complete. 
Summarizing, the two lines of research concentrated on different aspects of reasoning 
about terminologies. While Baader and Nebel studied the impact of definitions on 
reasoning, our work deals with reasoning in the presence of constraints on classes. 
4.3. Schemas with inverse roles 
Often, it would be convenient to make statements about inverses of roles in a schema. 
For instance, let the role employs be a shorthand for works-for-‘. Then with the ax- 
iom ResearchDept C Vemploys.Researcher, one can express that only researchers are 
working for a research department. 
As seen before, subsumption relations between names occurring in an S&schema 
S are obvious in the sense that A Es B iff A 5s B (Proposition 4.2)) while the 
difficulty of subsumption with respect to S&i,-schemas stems only from the difficulty 
of satisfiability checking (Proposition 4.15). However, if we allow for inverse roles in a 
schema, this may give rise also to implicit subsumption relationships between satisfiable 
concepts, as we illustrate with an example. Consider the following fragment of the 
company schema: 
S = { Researcher 5 (2 1 works-for), 
Researcher L Vworks-for.ResearchDept, 
ResearchDept C Vemploys.Employee}. 
Although the schema is isa-complete and Researcher -& Employee does not hold, it 
entails that Researcher is subsumed by Employee. Suppose that JOE is an arbitrary 
researcher. Then JOE works for some research department, say D007. Since research 
departments only employ employees, every individual employed by DO07 is an em- 
ployee. Hence, JOE is an employee. 
Detecting such implicit subsumption relations might be complex. Let us call SCiny 
the language obtained from SL: by allowing for inverse roles, i.e., S,&,” contains also 
concepts of the form VP-‘.A, (2 1 P-‘) and (< 1 P-l). In this subsection, we prove 
that subsumption of concept names with respect to S&-schemes is NP-hard. Moreover, 
we show that for S&v-schemas there is a difference between reasoning with respect to 
all models and reasoning with respect to all finite models. 
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4.3.1. Subsumption with respect to S&,-schemas is NP-hard 
We con:jtruct for every restricted AL&-concept C an S&,-schema Sc containing 
two concept names A and A’ such that Sc k A L A’ if and only if C is unsatisfiable. 
To specify the construction we inductively define a function Ac (D) that associates to 
each subconcept D of C the level at which D occurs in C: the concept C itself occurs 
at level 0; if D = D1 ll D2, then Ac(Di) := Ac( D); if D = 3R.D’ or if D = VR.D’ 
then AC (~3’) := AC (D) + 1. The level gives us the number of quantifiers in the scope 
of which 11 is located. 
We obtain SC by modifying the construction of SC in Section 4.2.1. We do not need 
the names A+, A-, but choose concept names Ao, . . . , Ak, where k = AC (I). Steps (1) 
to (3) remain exactly as they are for SC. However, instead of the axioms added in 
step (4), we enter the following axioms into SC: 
(4’) Ag C VP.Ak for all P E PC, if D = VQ.1; 
(5’) .‘ik g VP-‘.&_,, . . . , Al 5 VP-’ .A0 for all P E PC. 
To explain the underlying intuition, we need some definitions. If Z = (A’, .‘) is an 
interpretation, we say that a sequence do,. . . , d, of elements of A’ is a chain of length 
n from do I:O d, if there are roles PI, . . . , P, E Pc such that (d;_l,di) E Pi’ for i E I..n. 
We say that d, is reachable from do if there is a chain from do to d,. 
In Section 4.2.1, for an interpretation Z to be an SC-model, it is crucial that elements 
of AZ,, D == VQ.l_, d o not have P-fillers for any P E PC, Now, & is delined in such a 
way that for Z to be an SC-model where Ac is not interpreted as a subset of Ao, Z has 
to satisfy two properties: (i) there is some element d E A$ (since otherwise As = 0 is 
a subset of any set), and (ii) no element d’ E A$ which is reachable from d by a chain 
of length ii - 1 has a P-filler for any P E PC (since otherwise the axioms in (4’)) 
and (5’)) force d to be an element of A:). Thus, in both cases it is important that 
elements of A; do not have any P-fillers. 
Lemma 4.21. Let C be a restricted dIC&-concept. Then sc b Ac 5 A0 if and only if 
C is unsatisfiable. 
Proof. See the Appendix. Cl 
Theorem 4.22. Subsumption of concept names with respect to Sf&-schems is NP- 
hard. 
Proof. The claim follows by the preceding lemma because unsatisfiability of restricted 
d,CCE-concepts is NP-hard (see Section 4.2.1). 0 
As an upper bound, we have that reasoning in SL, ,nv is in EXPTIME. This follows 
from the same bound given in [ lo] for reasoning in the language ALUNZ, of which 
S.Ci”, is a sublanguage. 
4.3.2. Finite model reasoning 
For S&i,-schemas, it does not make a difference if we define satisfiability or sub- 
sumption of concept names with respect to all interpretations or with respect to finite 
interpretations, i.e., interpretations with finite domains. 
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However, in an S&,-schema S there may be concepts A, B such that AZ C BZ for 
all finite models of S, but not for all models. To see this, observe that S may require 
every model to interpret A as a set of cardinality at least as great as the cardinality of 
B. For example, consider the schema 
S = { Manager C (2 1 boss-‘), 
Manager 5 Vboss-‘.Employee, 
Employee C (6 1 boss)}, 
saying that every manager is the boss of at least one person, and that all persons a 
manager is the boss of are employees. Moreover, every employee has at most one 
boss. As a consequence, in any model one can map injectively every manager to some 
employee. Thus, in any finite model, the number of managers does not exceed the 
number of employees. If we add the axiom Employee C Manager, then for any finite 
model Z we have Employee ’ = ManageF. This need not be true in infinite mod- 
els. Consequently, in every finite model Z of S’ := S U {Employee L Manager} we 
have Manage? C Employeez, which need not hold in an infinite model. Reason- 
ing about schemas with respect to finite models has been investigated in [9, lo]. We 
will not study finite model reasoning in this paper, since this requires different tech- 
niques. 
5. Case studies 
In this section, we study some illustrative examples that show the advantages of 
the architecture we propose. We extend two systems by the language SL for cyclic 
schemas. The view languages are derived from two implemented systems described in 
the literature, namely KRIS [ 31 and CONCEPTBASE [ 221. 
For the extended systems, we study the complexity of the reasoning services, where, 
in particular, we obtain the following results: 
l combined complexity is not increased by the presence of terminological cycles in 
the schema; 
l reasoning with respect to schema complexity is always tractable. 
The second result can intuitively be interpreted as stating that in both cases the com- 
plexity of inferences is due to the view language alone. 
In this section, we assume that the view taxonomy is cycle-free. We also assume 
that no view names occur in the right-hand sides of view definitions or in the world 
description. In fact, this can be achieved by iteratively substituting every view name 
with its definition, which is possible because of our acyclicity assumption (see [ 291 for 
a discussion of this substitution and its complexity). In practice, this is equivalent to 
assuming that the view taxonomy is empty. Therefore, from this point on we do not take 
into account the view taxonomy, and we assume the knowledge base 2 to be simply a 
pair (S, W). 
The two systems stand for two different design paradigms (see [4] ) . Thus each case 
study emphasizes a different aspect of the benefits that can be gained from our proposal. 
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VI = Researcher n Vhas-degree.Engineering 
V2 = Employee FI 3has-degree.Engineering 
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Fig. 3. ALCNR-views. 
The syslem KRIS is built at DFKI and used in several applications as the knowledge 
representation component (see e.g., [ 381). The designers wanted to provide complete 
reasoning for a language which is so rich that no polynomial inference procedures are 
feasible (if P # NP). The concept language of KRIS is closed under propositional 
connectives and it provides universal and existential quantification over roles. For this 
reason, subsumption and instance checking are PSPACE-hard [3]. Since KRIS also 
provides number restrictions on roles, it is a proper extension of SL. Hence, the aspect 
in which our architecture goes beyond that of KRIS is that it allows for cycles going 
through schema concepts. We show that, for this extension, both view subsumption and 
instance checking remain in PSPACE. Instance checking was proved PSPACE-complete 
in [ 181 for the sublanguage of KRIS excluding role conjunction. As a byproduct, our 
proofs extend that result for the first time to the full language of KRIS. 
CONCEF’TBASE is a deductive object-oriented database system, which was developed 
at the University of Aachen. In CONCEPTBASE there is a distinction between classes in 
the schema and classes that define queries. The former correspond to schema concepts 
and the latter to view concepts in our framework. Class descriptions in CONCEPTBASE 
consist of two parts: a structural part, where essentially isa-relationships and restrictions 
on attributes are expressed, and a nonstructural part where additional membership condi- 
tions can be expressed with first-order formulas. The language in which the structural part 
of schema classes is specified coincides with SC. The view language we consider has 
been proposed in [ 71 as an extension of the structural part of query classes. In this case 
study the view language is not an extension of the schema language as in the previous 
cases. Instead, each of the two offers constructs that do not occur in the other. The design 
is such that all inferences are polynomial while combining in one language the constructs 
in the sche,ma and the view language would make reasoning intractable. Therefore, this 
case study illustrates that with our architecture one can reach a better compromise 
between expressivity and tractability than with the homogeneous traditional one. 
5.1. The language of KRIS as view language 
The system KRIS provides as its basic language dLCAfR, which is defined by the 
following syntax rules: 
C,D---+ AITIIICnDJCUDl~Cl~‘R.CI3R.CI(2nR)l(6nR) 
R -----$ P, n . . . n Pk 
The language ALCNR, first introduced in [ 201, allows one to express intersection, 
union, and complement of concepts, universal and existential quantification on roles, 
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number restrictions and role conjunction. Fig. 3 contains some examples of ALCNR- 
views. View VI denotes the researchers only having degrees in engineering. View V2 
denotes the employees who have a degree in engineering. Without any schema informa- 
tion there is no subsumption relationship between VI and V2. But given the schema of 
Fig. 2, ( I ) every researcher is an employee, and (2) every researcher has some degree. 
Hence, view VI is subsumed by t$. 
An ALCNR-knowledge base is a pair (S, W), where S is an SL-schema and W 
is an dLCN%world description, respectively. Throughout Section 5.1, by knowledge 
base we always mean ALCNIZ-knowledge base. 
We study the complexity of reasoning for both view subsumption C &s D and in- 
stance checking (S, W) b a: D, where C, D are ALCNR-concepts. For the complexity 
analysis, we assume that numbers in number restrictions are represented with unary 
encoding (i.e., a number n is represented as a string of n equal symbols). Alternatively, 
the analysis holds also if numbers cannot exceed a constant bound. 
Reasoning in ACCNR-knowledge bases can be done using a calculus similar to the 
tableaux calculus with equality in first-order logic. Schmidt-SchauB and Smolka [ 361 
first used such a calculus for the language ALC which is a sublanguage of dCCN7Z 
that allows to express neither number restrictions nor role conjunction. In the next 
subsection we introduce the calculus for ALCNR, and in the following one we study 
the complexity of reasoning by means of the calculus. 
5.1.1. Completion rules of the ACCNR-calculus 
The ALCNR-calculus operates on knowledge bases; it starts from the given knowl- 
edge base, called the initial knowledge base, and adds assertions to the world description 
by suitable completion rules. Before describing how assertions are added, we need to 
expand the syntax and the definitions in a suitable way. 
We assume that there exists an alphabet of new individuals, which are denoted by 
the letters X, y, z, and w, possibly with subscript. Individuals initially present in the 
knowledge base are called old individuals. We use the term individual for old and new 
individuals, and use s, t, u to denote individuals. Unlike the old individuals, which 
are always interpreted as different elements (recall the Unique Name Assumption in 
Section 2.1)) two (or more) new individuals might be interpreted as the same element; 
to enforce a different interpretation for two individuals s and t, we add the following 
new type of assertion in the world description: 
Formally, let Z be an interpretation: We say that Z satisjes the assertion s $ t if sz # t’. 
The definition of a model remains the same. 
To make the interpretation of old and new individuals homogeneous, we drop the UNA 
% 
m the definition of interpretation of old individuals, and we assume that a world 
description contains the assertion a #b for every pair a, b of distinct old individuals 
appearing in W. 
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of the above definitions. It 
shows that for developing algorithms one can concentrate on knowledge base satisfia- 
bility. 
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Sl: (S,W) ---$ (S, {s: A, t: B} u W) 
if 1. sPt is in W, and 
2. P L A x B is in S 
s2: (S,W) + (S,{sPy}u W) 
if 1. s: VP.C is in W, 
2. s: A is in W, 
3. A C (2 1 P) is in S, 
4. y is a fresh new individual, and 
5. there is no t such that sPt is in W 
S3: (S,W) + (S,{t:B}u W) 
if 1. s: A is in W, 
2. sPt is in W, and 
3. A E VP.B is in S 
S4: (S, W) + (S,{s: B} u W) 
if 1. s: A is in W, and 
2. A 5 B is in S 
s5: (S,W) + (S,{s:(~lP)}UW) 
if 1. s: A is in W, and 
2. A L (6 1 P) is in S 
Fig. 4. The schema rules for &CNR. 
Proposition 5.1. Let C, D be ALCNR-concepts, let (S, W) be an ALCNR-knowl- 
edge base, x a new and a an old individual. Then: 
(i) C KS D if and only if the knowledge base (S, {x: C n lD}) is unsatis$able. 
(ii) Fi,) k a: D if and only if the knowledge base (S, W U {a: lD}) is unsatis- 
a e. 
We assume that concepts are in negation normal form, i.e., the only complements they 
contain are of the form TA, where A is a concept name. Arbitrary ALCNR-concepts 
can be rewritten in linear time into equivalent concepts in negation normal form [ 151. 
The ALCNR-calculus is described by a set of ALCNR-completion rules, which 
are divided. into two subsets, the schema rules and the view rules. If it is clear from 
the context, we omit the prefix ALCNR. The input of the calculus is an ALCNR- 
knowledge base ,Z = (S, W). The completion rules add assertions to W until either a 
contradiction is generated or the knowledge base is recognized to be satisfiable. 
The schema rules are presented in Fig. 4. A completion rule is said to be applicable 
to a knowledge base Z$ if 2 satisfies the conditions associated with the rule and if 2 
is altered when transformed according to the rule. The second requirement is needed to 
ensure termination of our calculus. As an example, rule Sl is applicable to (S, W) if 
sPtisinMI,PgAxBisinS,andifs:Aandt:BarenotbothinW. 
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VI: (S, W) --f (S, {s: c,, s: C2) u W) 
if 1. s: Ci fl C2 is in W 
v2: (S,W) + (8, {XD} UW) 
if 1. s: Ci LJ C2 is in W, 
2. neither s: Ci nor s: Cz is in W, and 
3. D = c, or D = c2 
v3: (S, W) 4 (S,{t:C} u W) 
if 1. s:VR.C is in W, and 
2. t is an R-successor of s 
v4: (s,w) + (s,{sRiy,. . . ,sPky, y:C} u w) 
if 1. s: 3R.C is in W, 
2. R = P, fl . . . fl Pk, 
3. y is a fresh new individual, and 
4. there is no t such that t is an 
R-successor of s in W and 
t: C is in W 
v5: (S,W) --) (S,{SPlYj,.. .,sPky;~~~~..n}U{y;~yj~~,j~~..~,~#j}UW) 
if 1. s: (3 12 R) is in W, 
2. R = P, n.. . f-l Pk, 
3. yi, . . . , y,, are fresh new individuals, and 
4. there do not exist n R-successors of s in W 
V6: (S, W) -+ (S, wry/t]) 
if 1. s:(<nR) isin W, 
2. s has more than n R-successors in W, and 
3. y, t are two R-successors of s which are not separated 
Fig. 5. The view rules for ALCNR. 
Note that the schema rules treat axioms of the form A L (3 1 P) and A 5 VP.C 
differently from the others: The corresponding rules (S2 and S3) do not add the right- 
hand side of the axiom to W, but only the logical consequences of the axiom. In this way, 
schema rules never add to a world description assertions of the form s: VP.C or s: (3 
1 P) ; this is done for termination and complexity considerations (see Section 5.1.2). 
Moreover, rule S2 is applied only if a corresponding assertion exists in W (condition 1). 
Hence, the number of new individuals generated because of schema axioms is bounded 
by the number of assertions in the world description. 
Before providing the view rules, we introduce some more notation. Let W be a world 
description and R = PI Il. . . n Pk (k 2 1) be a role. We then say that t is an R-successor 
ofsinWifsPlt,...,sPktxehW. 
We say that s and t are separated in W if the assertion s + t is in W. 
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Let W be a world description, n a new individual, and s an individual; with W [ n/s] 
we denote the world description obtained by replacing each occurrence of x in W by s 
(observe that we never replace an old individual). 
The vierv rules are presented in Fig. 5. The rules Vl to V5 break up assertions 
into more elementary assertions. The rule V6 identifies individuals according to at-most 
restrictions.. 
The rule:s V2 and V6 can be applied in different ways to the same assertion, so that 
the result of their application depends on a nondeterministic choice. For this reason, we 
call them nondeterministic rules. Moreover, we call the rules S2, V6 and V5 generating 
rules, since: they introduce new individuals into the world description. All other rules 
are called rtongenerating. 
If _Y and Y are two AEN%knowledge bases, then 2’ is said to be directly de- 
rived from _X if it is obtained from 2 by the application of an ACCNR-completion 
rule, and 2:’ is said to be derived from 2 if it is obtained from 2 by a sequence of 
applications. 
The nexl: theorem shows that both schema and view rules do not add unnecessary 
contradictions; that is, starting from a satisfiable knowledge base there is always a way 
of applying the rules which leads to a satisfiable knowledge base again (multiple ways 
of applying rules are possible, since the rules V2 and V6 are nondeterministic). 
Theorem 5i.2 (Invariance). Let 2 be an ACCNR-knowledge base. 
(i) Let 2’ be directly derived from 2. if 2’ is satisfiable then 2 is satisfiable. 
(ii) Conversely, if 2 is satisfiable and a rule is applicable to 8, then there exists a 
satisfiable knowledge base 2 directly derived from 2 using that rule. 
The proof of the Invariance Theorem is mainly a rephrasing of the soundness of 
tableaux rules in first-order logic. A similar theorem was proved in [6] with JltcCNR 
as a langualge for expressing schema axioms between concepts (i.e., statements of the 
form C C i3). The only kind of schema statements not considered in the cited paper is 
P 5 A x B, whose corresponding rule is obviously sound. 
A knowledge base is complete if no completion rule applies to it. Any complete 
knowledge base derived from _Z is called a completion of 2. 
In Section 5.1.2 we show that the completion process always terminates, i.e., it always 
reaches a completion, and that the satisfiability of a complete knowledge base can be 
decided very easily by looking for obvious contradictions, which we call clashes. 
An dENI&knowledge base (S, W) contains a clash if one of the following situa- 
tions occurs: 
(i) s: A_ E W, for some individual s, 
(ii) {s: A, s: ‘A} c W, for some individual s and some concept name A, 
(iii) {s:(<nR)}U{sP,t;,..., sPkt[ 1 i E l..n+ 1) 
U{ti+tjIi,jE l..n+l,i # j}C W, 
where R= PI Fl...flPk. 
A clash is given by an evidently unsatisfiable set of assertions, hence any world 
description containing a clash is obviously unsatisfiable. The third case represents the 
situation in which it is asserted that an individual has at most n R-successors, and at 
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the same time it has more than 12 R-successors, none of which can be identified with 
another, because the successors are pairwise separated. 
Obviously, a knowledge base that contains a clash cannot be satisfiable. Consequently, 
if all completions contain a clash, then by the Invariance Theorem S.Z(ii) we know that 
the original knowledge base was unsatisfiable. If, however, one of the completions is 
clash-free then the corresponding canonical interpretation Zx (as defined below) is a 
model of the completion (see Proposition 5.4). Again by the Invariance Theorem 5.2(i) 
we conclude that the original knowledge base was satisfiable. 
Given a complete knowledge base 2 = (S, W), we choose a new individual u not 
appearing in W and define the canonical interpretation 12 as follows: 
A’-‘ := {s / s is an individual in W U {u}}, 
ST_’ .- .-s, 
A’-‘ := {s 1 s: A is in W U {u}}, 
lJ=x := {(s, t) 1 sPt is in W U {(u,u)}} 
U {(s, u) 1 there is no sPt in W, but for some A, 
s: A is in W and A 5 (2 1 P) is in S}. 
Note that the canonical interpretation uses all the individuals of the knowledge base, plus 
the special individual u which appears in the interpretation of every primitive concept 
and is related to itself by every role P. As pointed out before, the schema rules are 
designed such that not every necessary role will get a new individual as filler. The 
purpose of u is to satisfy all axioms A L (2 1 P) for those individuals s such that s: A 
is in W, but that have no P-successor in W. 
These considerations show that satisfiability of dLCN%knowledge bases is decid- 
able, which we prove in the following subsection. In fact, we do more: Instead of just 
proving termination of the calculus, we prove the stronger result that there is a way 
of applying completion rules such that they always terminate and use just polynomial 
space with respect to combined complexity and polynomial time with respect to schema 
complexity. Thus, we have the following result: 
Theorem 5.3. With SL as schema language and ALCNX as view language, view 
subsumption and instance checking are PSPACE-complete with respect to combined 
complexity, and in PTIME with respect to schema complexity. 
5.1.2. Correctness and complexity of the ACCNR-calculus 
To prove Theorem 5.3, we first show that the canonical interpretation of a complete 
clash-free knowledge base is a model. Together with the Invariance Theorem this gives 
us the soundness of the d.CCNR-calculus. Then we turn to termination and complexity 
and thus show completeness. 
Proposition 5.4. A complete, clash-free ACCNR-knowledge base is satisfiable. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
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Before we consider termination and complexity, we need some more definitions, which 
are based on viewing the individuals in a world description as nodes in a graph, and 
assertions albout roles as labeled arcs in this graph. We say that t is a direct successor of 
s in W if for some role R, the individual t is an R-successor of s. If W is clear from the 
context we simply say that t is an R-successor or a direct successor of t. Moreover, we 
call successor the transitive closure of the relation “direct successor” and predecessor 
its inverse. 
For A.CCNR-knowledge bases, the “successor” relation restricted to new individuals 
forms a tree: 
Proposition 5.5. Let (S, W’) be derivedfrom the initial knowledge base (S, W). Then 
no new individual W’ is a direct successor of two different individuals. 
Proof. Obviously, in W there is no new individual. By an analysis of all rules of the 
dCCN%calculus it can be shown that the property of the proposition is invariant under 
rule applications. 0 
The calculus proposed in the previous section requires to compute all the completions 
of an initial knowledge base 2. Unfortunately, such completions may be of exponen- 
tial size with respect to the size of 2, hence the nondeterministic calculus requires 
exponential space. 
To obtain a polynomial-space calculus, it is therefore crucial not to keep an entire 
complete world description in memory, but to store only small portions of it at a time. 
We modify the previous completion rules, so that they build up only a portion of a 
complete knowledge base and we call the modified rules trace rules. 
The trace rules consist of the rules presented above, but adding to the application 
conditions of the generating rules S2, V4, V5 the following further condition: 
l For all assertions tP’z in W, either t is a predecessor of s or s = t 
We label S:!‘, V4’, VS these modified rules. 
Let T be a knowledge base obtained from 2 by application of the trace rules. We call 
T a trace of 2Y if no trace rule applies to T. 
Completion rules and trace rules are always applied to a knowledge base (S, W) 
because of the presence in W of an assertion s: C, or spt (condition 1 of all rules). We 
exploit this property by saying that a rule is applied to the assertion s: C, or applied to 
the individual s (instead of saying that it is applied to the knowledge base (S, W)). 
We require that trace rules are applied using the following strategy: 
(i) apply a rule to a new individual only if no rule is applicable to an old one; 
(ii) apply a rule to a new individual x only if no rule is applicable to a new 
individual y such that y is a predecessor of x; 
(iii) apply generating rules only if no nongenerating rule is applicable. 
Using this strategy, trace rules exhibit the following behavior: Given an individual 
s, if at least one generating rule is applicable to s, all of s’s successors yt, . . . , y,, are 
introduced. Then, after possibly further nongenerating rules are applied to s, one new 
individual J; is (nondeterministically) chosen, and all successors of vi are introduced. 
Unlike normal completion rules, no successor is introduced for any individual different 
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from y;, Then, one individual is chosen among the successors of yi, which plays the 
role of yi before. 
The reason why we introduce all the successors of the “chosen” individual is the 
following: For every chosen individual s all direct successors of s must be present 
simultaneously at some stage of the computation, since the number restrictions force us 
to identify certain successors. This is important because, when identifying individuals, 
the assertions about them are combined, which may lead to clashes that otherwise would 
not have occurred. 
Trace rules for checking satisfiability of concepts without the presence of a schema 
for the language ACC were defined in [36], and were extended to more expressive 
languages in [ 15,19,20]. A polynomial-space algorithm that checks the satisfiability of 
an ACCNR-concept C by generating all completions while keeping only one trace in 
memory at a time, is given in [ 151. 
We now adapt those previous results to the presence of a schema, first for view 
subsumption and later on also for instance checking. The union of two traces 7’r = 
(S, Wt ), T2 = (S, I%) is defined as TI U T2 = (S, Wr U W2). 
We call depth of a concept D, written depth(D), the maxima1 sequence of nested 
quantifiers in D (including also number restrictions as quantifiers). More precisely: 
deptb( D) := 
I 
0 if D is of the form A, I, or T, 
1 ifDisoftheform(>nR)or(<nR), 
deprh( C) if D is of the form 4, 
max(depth(Di)) if D is of the form D1 n D2 or D1 U D2, 
depth(C) + 1 if D is of the form VR.C or 3R.C. 
The following proposition collects a number of properties concerning the depth of 
concepts and traces. 
Proposition 5.6. Let C be an ALCCNR-concept, x a new individual, and W = {x: C} 
the corresponding world description; let S be an SC-schema, and .Z = (S, W) the 
corresponding knowledge base. Then: 
(i) For every chain of direct successors x, ~1,. . . , yt, in a knowledge base derived 
from 2, if y;: D is in W, and yi: D has been added by the application of a view 
rule then depth(D) 6 depth(C) - i. 
(ii) For every chain of direct successors n, ~1,. . . , yr, in a knowledge base derived 
from 8, the length of the chain h is bounded by /C( (the size of C). 
(iii) Let N be the maximal number of direct successors of an individual in a trace. 
Then N is bounded by (C 1. 
(iv) The size of a trace issuing from 2 is polynomially bounded by JC/ and linearly 
bounded by ISI. 
(v) Every completion of 2 can be obtained as the union of finitely many traces. 
(vi) Suppose 2’ = (S, W’) is a completion of 2, and 7 is a finite set of traces such 
that Z’ = UTEl T. Then 2’ contains a clash if and only if some T E ‘T contains 
a clash. 
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Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
Now we can prove the main result about the complexity of view subsumption in 
d.CC%‘?-knowledge bases: 
Proposition 5.7. Let S be an SC-schema, and C, D be ALCNR-concepts. Then: 
(ii) Checking C CIs D can be done in polynomial space with respect to ISI, ICI, 
and IDI; 
(ii) Checking C YES D can be done in polynomial time with respect to ISI. 
Proof. Combining Proposition 5.6 with Proposition 5.1 (i), one directly proves that 
view subsumption can be checked in nondeterministic polynomial space with respect 
to combined complexity. In fact, in order to check that (S, {x: C fl lD}) is satisfiable, 
one generates a clash-free completion keeping in memory only one of its traces at a 
time. 
A deterministic check must also explore all possible choices given by the assertions 
of the form s: Ct U Cz and s: ( < n I?). Any time the most recent choice (e.g., s: Ct ) 
having an alternative gives rise to at least one trace containing a clash, the alternative 
is taken (e.g., s: CT), and all traces are recomputed for this new choice. The method is 
basically a rephrasing of the exploration of an AND-OR tree (AND nodes correspond 
to different traces to be generated, while OR nodes correspond to alternative choices). 
Since the nlested choices to be kept in memory at one time are polynomially many (they 
cannot exceed the size of a trace), also this deterministic version of the method is in 
PSPACE. This proves Proposition 5.7(i) . 
The result on schema complexity of view subsumption (Proposition 5.7( ii) ) is proved 
in two steps: 
Step 1: We prove that both the number of traces in a completion of (S, {x: C l’l D’}), 
where D’ is the negation normal form of lD, and the number of completions depends 
only on ICI and IDI. Observe that the number of traces in a completion depends on the 
number of applications of generating rules, while the number of different completions 
depends on the number of choices of applications of nondeterministic rules. All these 
rules require (condition 1 of all mentioned rules) the presence of assertions which are 
not added by schema rules, except for an assertion of the form s: (< 1 P), which can 
be introduced by rule S5. However, this assertion leaves no choice to rule V6 but leads 
it to identify all direct P-successors of s. Hence the presence of this assertion does not 
lead to multiple completions. Moreover, the number of different applications of rule V6 
depends on the number of direct successors of an individual. Hence, both the number of 
traces in a completion and the number of possible completions depend on the number of 
individuals generated. Since the “successor” relation restricted to new individuals forms 
a tree (see Proposition 5.5), the number of individuals can be estimated by N’*, where 
N is the tree branching factor-the number of direct successors of an individual-and 
h is the tree depth. From Proposition 5.6(ii) and (iii), both h and N are bounded by 
ICI + IDI, which proves the claim. 
Step 2: Observe that, since the number of traces in a completion and the number of 
completions depend only on r I and IDI, schema complexity can be computed from the 
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maximal size of a single trace. This size is linear in ISI, as proved in Proposition 5.6( iv). 
Therefore, schema complexity is in PTIME, and more precisely in 0( IS/). 17 
We now turn to to the problem of instance checking. For view subsumption we can 
suppose that the initial knowledge base contains only one assertion, namely an assertion 
of the form n: C for an AUNT-concept C. Then, x is the root of the “tree of traces”. 
This is no longer true for instance checking. Since the problem of checking whether a is 
an instance of C with respect to a knowledge base (S, W) is reduced to the satisfiability 
of the knowledge base (S, W U {a: -C}), the world description may contain arbitrary 
assertions. 
The trace algorithm for subsumption of ACC-concepts given by Schmidt-Schaug and 
Smolka [36] was extended by Baader and Holhmder [3] to solve instance checking in 
ACC-world descriptions (see also [ 171). The basic idea there is to reduce satisfiability 
of an arbitrary knowledge base to the satisfiability of a number of knowledge bases with 
only one individual. This is achieved by introducing projections. 
Let (S, W) be a knowledge base and s an individual in W. The projection of W 
along s, denoted as W,, is the world description formed by all assertions s: C that are 
in W. In other words, ?V, represents all the information about the concepts which s is 
an instance of, according to W. 
In order to get a correct method, the basic idea has to be refined. Before considering 
projections, one has to make all properties of old individuals explicit. This is captured 
by the notion of a precompletion. 
A knowledge base is said to be a precompletion of another knowledge base 2 if it 
is obtained from 2 by applying the completion rules only to old individuals, as far as 
possible. lo 
Now, for checking the satisfiability of a knowledge base 2, one can examine each 
clash-free precompletion 2 = (S, W’) of 2, extract the various knowledge bases 
(S, W:)) for all new individuals x appearing in W’, and independently check them 
for satisfiability. The correctness of this method follows from the next propositions. 
Proposition 5.8. A knowledge base 2 = (S, W) is satis$able if and only if there exists 
a precompletion 2’ = (S, W’) of 2 that is satisfiable. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
Intuitively, the above proposition states that one can always build a clash-free comple- 
tion by first computing a precompletion, and then applying rules to new individuals. The 
next proposition shows that rules can be applied to new individuals for each individual 
independently. 
Proposition 5.9. A precompletion 2’ = (S, W’) of 2 is satisjiable if and only if it is 
clash-free, and for each new individual x in W’, the knowledge base (S, W:) has a 
clash-free completion. 
“’ Notice that this notion of precompletion is different from the one given in [ 171 
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Proof. See the Appendix. q 
The size of precompletions is polynomially bounded by the size of the schema and 
the world dlescription of the initial knowledge base: 
Proposition 5.10. Every precompletion of a knowledge base 2 = (S, W) has polyno- 
mial size with respect to 2, and the number of individuals in it does not depend on 
ISI. 
Proof. See the Appendix. Cl 
Now we can prove the main result concerning instance checking in ACCNR- 
knowledge bases: 
Proposition 5.11. Let S be an S&schema, W an ALCNR-world description, a an 
individual, and D an ALCNR-concept. Then: 
(i) Checking (S, W) k a: D can be done in polynomial space with respect to ISI, 
IWI, and IDI; 
(ii) Checking (S, W) b a: D can be done in polynomial time with respect to ISI. 
Proof. To check whether (S, W) + a: D, one has to check whether the knowledge base 
(S, WU {a: D’}), where D ’ is the negation normal form of -D, is unsatisfiable (Propo- 
sition 5.1 To this end, compute (nondeterministically) a clash-free precompletion 2 of 
(S, W U {a: D’}) (this needs polynomial space by Proposition 5. IO); then, for each new 
individual J: in Y, check whether there is a clash-free completion of (S, W:) using the 
trace calculus developed before. Again, this needs polynomial space. The deterministic 
version just keeps track of all backtracking points in applications of nondeterministic 
rules. 
We now turn to the second point of the proposition. Let 2 = (S, W) be an AENR- 
knowledge base. We prove the claim in four steps. 
Step 1: The number of individuals in a precompletion does not depend on ISI, by 
Proposition 5.10. Call this number I. 
Step 2: For each assertion of the form s: Cl I- Cz, there are two different applications 
of rule V2 to the assertion; hence there are at most 2’ different applications, for each 
concept Cl UC, in W. Therefore, the total number of different applications of rule 
V2 is 0( I)/VI .2’), which does not depend on ISI. Similarly, the number of different 
applications of rule V6 to the assertion s: ( < n R) is bounded by Z( I - 1) . . . (n + 1) 
(the number of sequences of elements of l..Z of length Z - n), and the total number of 
different applications of rule V6 does not depend on ISI. 
Step 3: Since the number of possible precompletions depends only on the number of 
different applications of nondeterministic rules, this number is 0( 1) with respect to ISI. 
Step 4: The schema complexity of the entire method is the product of the following 
factors: 
l the maximal number of precompletions (a constant with respect to ISI), 
l the time to compute a precompietion (linear in [S[ from Proposition 5.10), 
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l the number of new individuals in a precompletion (I, a constant with respect to S), 
l the schema complexity of the trace calculus applied to (S, W:) (again, linear in 
ISI). 
Therefore, the schema complexity of instance checking is in 0( lS12). 0 
Summing up, by Propositions 5.7 and 5.11 we proved Theorem 5.3. 
While the combined complexity of inferences in our case, with ALCNR as view lan- 
guage and SC as schema language, is PSPACE, using ACCNI?, also as the schema lan- 
guage raises the combined complexity to EXPTIME-hardness [ 341. However, subsump- 
tion between ACCNR-concepts (without any schema) is already PSPACE-complete. 
Hence, we can conclude that simple inclusion axioms with cycles can be added to 
systems like KRIS without changing substantially the complexity of reasoning services, 
whereas adding full cyclic definitions increases significantly the complexity. 
It is important to note that the results on schema complexity can be extended to 
other languages (e.g., ALC plus inverse roles). In fact, the schema rules are valid 
independently of the view rules and they can be applied a polynomial number of times 
with respect to the size of the schema, still independently of the view rules. The key 
point is that schema rules create new individuals only if an assertion of the form 
x:VR.C is present, and schema rules themselves never add such assertions to a world 
description. Hence, the number of applications of the schema rules is fixed by the size 
of the knowledge base generated by the view rules and by the number of assertions of 
the form x:VR.C the view rules can generate. This is a constant with respect to the 
size of the schema (unless the view contains some constructors that can trigger infinite 
applications of the rules, like the transitive closure construct). 
5.2. The language of CONCEPTBASE as view language 
In [ 71 the query language QC was defined, which is derived from the CONCEPTBASE 
system. In &L, roles are formed with all the constructs of Table 2. That is, roles can 
be primitive roles P or inverses P-’ of primitive roles. Furthermore, there are role 
restrictions, written (R: C), where R is a role and C is a &C-concept. Intuitively, 
(R: C) restricts the pairs related by R to those whose second component satisfies C. 
Roles can be composed to so-called paths: RI o R2 0. . . o R,. In QC, concepts are formed 
according to the rule: 
C,D- AITI{a})CflD)3R.C13Q-R. 
Observe that concepts and roles can be arbitrarily nested through role restrictions. All 
concepts in QC correspond to existentially quantified formulas. We feel that many 
practical queries are of this form and do not involve universal quantification. 
Fig. 6 contains some examples of &L queries. Suppose we are given the schema of 
Fig. 2. Query Qi denotes all the managers and Q2 all the employees that get a high 
salary. Then query Qr is subsumed by Q2 since every manager is an employee and 
salaries of managers must be high salaries. Query Qs denotes all the researchers that 
live in the town in which the department they are working for is situated. Query QJ 
denotes all the employees that work for a research department that the city they are 
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Ql = Manager 
Q2 = Employee fl 3salary.HighSalary 
Q3 = Researcher n Gilives-in A works-for o situated 
Q4 = Employee n Fl(works-for: ResearchDept) - lives-in o hosts 
Fig. 6. QL queries. 
living in is hosting. With hosts being the inverse of situated, query Q3 is subsumed by 
Q4. This is because every researcher is an employee and any department he works for 
is a research department. 
For the combination of SL and &L: in our architecture, we have the following results: 
Theorem 5.12. With SL as schema language and &L as view language, view sub- 
sumption and instance checking are in PTIME with respect to combined complexity. 
The result on instance checking is an easy consequence of the one on view sub- 
sumption observing that, by means of singletons, a world description can be completely 
described by means of concepts so that instance checking can then be reduced to sub- 
sumption checking (as shown in [ 331). Intuitively, the assertion a: C corresponds to 
the concept: {a} FIG and the assertion aRb to the concept {a} I-I 3R.{b}. More precisely, 
the transformation @ of a world description into a concept is defined as follows. Let W 
be a world description, C a concept, and a, b two old individuals, then 
@(J”J) := n,a,w,@(a>, 
@(a:C):=3Q.({a}nC), 
@(aRb) := 3Q.({a} n 3R.{b}), 
where Q does not appear in W. Intuitively, @ “encodes” the world description W in the 
implicit assertions of the concept @J(W). The following proposition states the relation 
between the W and Q(W). 
Proposition 5.13. Given a schema S, a world description W, an old individual a, and 
a concept C, then: 
(i) W ,Is satisjiable iff @( W) is satisfiable, 
(ii) (S, W) f= C(a) ifs@(W) n {a} LS C. 
Proposition 5.13 can be proved analogously to Lemma 6.6 of [ 331. 
A detailed proof of the view subsumption part of Theorem 5.12 can be found in 
[ 71, But, since the proof requires techniques quite different from the ones used in the 
preceding case study, we will demonstrate the main characteristics of these techniques 
for a restricted schema and query language. The restricted query language SL- is 
defined by the rule 
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Dl: (S, 3)(G) --) (S, {s: c, s: D} u 3)(G) 
if 1. s: C fl D is in 3 
D2: (S,3)@) + (S, {S&Y: C} U F)(G) 
if 1. x3P.C is in F’, 
2. there is no t such that sPt and t: C are in 3, and 
3. y is a fresh new individual 
Sl: (S,3)@) -+ (S, (1: A2) u F)(G) 
if 1. s:A, and sPt are in 3, and 
2, A1 C VP.A2 is in S 
s2: (S, 3) (9) -+ (S, {SPY) u 3)(6) 
if 1. there is an A such that s: A is in 3, 
2. A g (2 1 P) is in S, 
3. there is no t such that spt is in 3, and s: 3P.C is in 9, and 
4. y is a fresh new individual 
Gl: (S,3)(6) --$ (S,3)(0 U {s:C,s: D}) 
if 1. s:CnD is in 17 
G2: (S, 3) (L7) + (S,3)(6U {r:C}) 
if 1. s:3P.C is in G, and 
2. sPt is in 3 
Cl: (S, 3)(9) --f (S, {s: C n D} U 3)(G) 
if 1. s:C and s: D are in 3, and 
2. s: C FI D is in 6 
C2: (S,3)(6) * (S, {s: 3P.C) u 3) (G) 
if 1. there is a t such that sPt and t: C are in 3, and 
2. s: 3P.C is in G 
Fig. 7. The decomposition, schema, goal, and composition rules. 
D - VP.A I(> 1 P). 
An SC--schema contains only inclusions of the form A C D. In the restricted query 
language QL- there are no role forming operators and concepts are formed according 
to the following syntax rule: 
C,D-+ A(CtlD13P.C. 
The basic idea for deciding subsumption between views C and D is as follows. We 
take an object s and transform C into a prototypical knowledge base where s is an 
instance of C. We do so by generating objects, entering them into concepts, and relating 
them through roles. Then we evaluate D over this knowledge base. If s belongs to the 
instances of D then C is subsumed by D. If not, we have an interpretation where an 
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object is in C but not in D and therefore C is not subsumed by D. The next proposition 
gives the formal justification for this idea. 
Proposition 5.14. Let S be an SL--schema, C, D be QLC--concepts, and s be an 
individual. Then 
C CIs D if (S, {s: C}) /= s: D. 
The transformation and evaluation process is specified by a calculus, the Q,!Z-calculus 
that features four kinds of rules: decomposition, schema, goal, and composition rules. 
The rules work on a knowledge base that consists of the schema S and a world de- 
scription 3-called the facts-and on a second world description E called the goals. 
The knowlcedge base and the goals together are called a pair (S, F)(G). In order to 
decide whether C & D, we take an individual s and start with the knowledge base 
(S, {s: C}) and the goal {s: D}. Applying the rules, we add more facts and goals 
until no more rule is applicable. Intuitively, C is subsumed by D iff the final knowl- 
edge base contains the fact s: D. This is a difference to the refutation style calculus 
of the first case study, where we start with the knowledge base (S, {s: C, s: -D}) 
and check the completions for clashes. In the case of &L as view language this 
would lead to an exponential number of possible completions. All rules of this cal- 
culus exploit the hierarchical structure of concepts, which is the basic reason for 
the polynomiality of the procedure. The rules are presented in Fig. 7. A rule is ap- 
plicable to a pair if it satisfies the conditions associated with the rule and if the 
pair is altered when transformed according to the rule. The second requirement is 
needed to (ensure termination of our calculus. As an example, rule Dl is applicable 
to a pair (S, 3)(G) if 3 contains a fact s: C n D and if either s: C or s: D is not 
in 3. 
The decomposition rules (Dl, D2) work on facts. They break up the initial fact s: C 
into facts involving only primitive concepts and primitive roles. 
The schema rules (S 1, S2) also work on facts. They add information derivable from 
the schema and the current facts. The first rule is simple, It adds membership assertions 
for individuals in 3. Rule 52, however, which might create a new individual, is subject 
to a tricky control that limits the number of new individuals: it is only applicable if it 
creates a role filler that is required by a goal. This control is comparable to the control 
of the corresponding rules in the preceding case study. There the application is restricted 
to universally constrained individuals (see rule S2 in Fig. 4). Note that an existential 
quantification in a goal would give rise to a universal quantification in the refutation style 
calculus. Without this control, an exponential number of individuals could be introduced 
in the worsl: case. 
The goal rules (Gl, G2) work on goals. They guide the evaluation of the concept 
D by deriving subgoals from the original goal s: D. The interesting rule is G2, since it 
relates goals to facts: if the goal is to find s: 3P.C, then the only individuals tested are 
the ones which are explicitly mentioned as P-fillers of s in the facts. 
The composition rules (Cl, C2) compose complex facts from simpler ones directed 
by the goals. This can be understood as a bottom-up evaluation of concept D over 3. 
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Both the decomposition rule D2 and the schema rule S2 can introduce individuals. 
Since the individuals introduced by D2 carry more specific information than the ones 
created by S2, decomposition rules receive priority, i.e., a schema rule can be applied 
only if no decomposition rule is applicable. This strategy contributes to keeping the 
whole procedure polynomial. 
In [ 71 one can find the full calculus and a proof that for Q&concepts C, D and an 
S&Schema S, we have that C Cs D if and only if s: D is in the completed facts. 
The complexity result is based on the observation that the number of individuals 
in the completion (S, .7=c)(G~) of (S, {s: C})({s: D}) is polynomially bounded by the 
size of C and D. For every individual introduced by a decomposition rule, there is an 
existentially quantified subconcept of C. Hence, the number of individuals generated 
by decomposition rules is less or equal to the size of C. Let us call these individuals 
primary individuals. Then, since the introduction of individuals by the schema rule S2 
is controlled by the structure of D, one can show that for every primary individual the 
number of nonprimary successors is bounded by the size of D. Summarizing, we get a 
polynomial upper bound for the number of individuals. One can show that the number 
of rule applications is polynomially bounded by the number of individuals and the size 
of the schema S. Thus, the completion of (S, {s: C}) ({s: D}) can be computed in time 
polynomial in the size of C, D and S. This yields our claim. 
Theorem 5.12 illustrates the benefits of the new architecture because by restricting 
universal quantification to the schema and existential quantification to views we can 
have both without losing tractability. Note that in the language ALE (cf. Section 4.2.1) 
which contains both universal and existential quantification, subsumption checking is 
NP-hard, even for cycle-free terminologies. 
6. Conclusion 
We have proposed to replace the traditional TBox in a terminological system by two 
components: a schema, where primitive concepts describing frame-like structures are 
introduced, and a view part that contains defined concepts. We feel that this architecture 
reflects adequately the way terminological systems are used in most applications. 
We also think that this distinction can clarify the discussion about the semantics of 
cycles. Given the different functionalities of the schema and view part, we propose that 
cycles in the schema are interpreted with descriptive semantics while for cycles in the 
view part a definitional semantics should be adopted. 
In two case studies we have shown that the revised architecture yields a better tradeoff 
between expressivity and the complexity of reasoning. 
The schema language SL: we have introduced might be sufficient in many cases. 
Sometimes, however, one might want to impose more integrity constraints on primitive 
concepts than can be expressed in it. We see two solutions to this problem: Either 
we enrich the language and have to pay by a more costly reasoning process, ” or we 
” Recently, Calvanese [ 81 has determined the complexity of reasoning about schemas in various extensions 
of SL, building on the results and techniques described in the present paper. 
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treat such constraints in a passive way by only verifying them for the objects in the 
knowledge base. The second alternative can be given a logical semantics in terms of 
epistemic operators (see [ 161) . 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let S be an S&,-schema. Obviously, S is locally valid if it 
is valid. TCI prove the converse, it suffices to show that for any concept names Al, AZ, 
given two models Zi and 12 of S with Af’ # 8 and Aifi # 0 we can construct a model 
Z of S such that A; # 0 and A: # 0. 
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the domains AZ1 and A4 are disjoint. 
We then define Z on the domain A’ := AZ’ U AZ by A’ := AZ’ U AZ2 for every concept 
name A, P-I := Pzl U P z, for every role name P, and a’ := a” for every individual a. 
It is easy to verify that in the language SCdi, for every concept C we have Cz = 
Czl u Cz. We conclude that an axiom satisfied by Zt and 12 is also satisfied by 1. 
Hence, Z is a model of S. By construction, both Al and A2 are interpreted under Z as 
nonempty s,ets. 0 
Proof of Lemma 4.5. “=+” Suppose SC is valid. There is an interpretation 3 = 
( A9, .z) such that A: # 8. We modify _7 so as to yield an interpretation Z = (AZ, +‘) 
with Cz # 0. We define Z as equal to ,7 for every symbol occurring in Sc and put 
Q= := Upc.pc P 3, Since J is a model of SC, so is 1, and AZ # 8. We show by 
induction over the structure of concepts that A$ C D” for every subconcept D of C. 
This implies that A$ C Cz and, since As f 8, the claim follows. 
Base case: If D = T, then AZ 2 A3 = Tz. Suppose that D = VQ.1. The schema 
Sc contains the axiom A+ C TA-, and for every P E PC the axioms AD C VP.A+ 
and AD L VP.A-. Thus, if d E AD, ’ then d has no filler for any of the roles P E 
PC. Otherwise, such a filler would be an element of (A+)’ and of (A-)‘, which is 
impossible, because these sets are disjoint. This proves that A$ g (VQ.J-)z. 
Inductive case: If D = D’ fl D”, then Sc contains the axioms AD 5 ADI and AD L 
AD!!. By the induction hypothesis we know that A& G D” and A& c D”‘, Hence, 
A; 2 AI,, (-I AZ,,, C D’= n D”= = Dr. 
If D = 3Q.D’, then Sc contains the axioms AD g ( 2 1 PO) and AD L VPD.D’. This 
implies that for any d E A$ there is some d’ with (d, d’) E Pg and d’ E A$,. Then, 
by definition of Q, we have (d, d’) E Q’, and by the induction hypothesis we have 
A$ 2 D”. Hence, d E (3Q.D’)‘. This shows that A; 5 (3Q.D’)‘. 
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If D = QQ.D’, D’ # I, then SC contains for every P E PC the axiom AD C VP.Ap. 
Let d E A5 and (d, d’) E QT. By definition of Q we have (d, d’) E Pz for some 
P E PC. From the axioms it follows that d’ E A&, which together with the induction 
hypothesis A& 5 D” implies that d’ E 0”. This shows that A: C (QQ.D’)z. 
“+” Suppose C is satisfiable. We construct an interpretation Z such that As # 0. 
The concept C has a model 3. We extend 2 to an interpretation Z by defining 
A’ := AZ U {d+, d-1, where d+, d- are t wo distinct objects that are not elements 
of AZ. The interpretation of the symbols in Sc is given by A$, := Dg for every 
subconcept D of C (A+)’ := d+ { ), (A-)’ := {d-}, and, for D of the form 3Q.D’, 
Pz := {(d,d’) 1 d ; A:, d’ E A$, (d,d’) E QJ} for every P E PC. 
We check that Z satisfies every axiom in SC. For any D = D’ n D”, SC contains the 
axioms AD C AD, and AD 5 AD!), which are satisfied, since by definition of 1, we 
have A5 = (D’ n D”),7 = Dts fl D”’ = A& n AZ pt. 
If D = 3Q.D’, then Sc contains the axioms AD C (2 1 PO) and AD L VPLI.D’. 
Since A$ = (3Q.D’)g, for every d E AZ = Dz there is some d’ E D” such that 
(d,d’) E Q”, which implies that (d, d’) E Pz. Thus, the first axiom is satisfied. By 
definition of Pg, every filler for PD is an element of A$. Thus, the second axiom is 
satisfied. 
If D = VQ.D’, then Sc contains for every P E PC the axiom AD C ‘dP.Ap. By 
definition, we have A; = D3, A& = Dt3, and Pz C Qg. This implies that all such _ 
axioms are satisfied. 
If D = t/Q.-L, then there are axioms A+ 5 --JA-, and AD C QP.A+, AD C QP.A- for 
every P E PC. By construction, (A+)’ and (A-)z are disjoint. Thus, the first axiom 
is satisfied. Moreover, since Dz = (QQ.1)” and P’ G Q” for ‘all P E PC, it follows 
that elements of A; do not have a filler for any role P E PC. Thus, the latter axioms 
are satisfied. 
This proves that Z is a model of Sc. Also, we have that A$ = C3 # 0. However, it 
might be the case that A; = 0 for some prop er subconcept D # _L of C. Since such 
a subconcept D is satisfiable, it has a model from which we can construct in a similar 
way as above a model of Sc that interprets AD as a nonempty set. This proves that Sc 
is locally valid. By Proposition 4.3, Sc is valid. q 
Proof of Lemma 4.8. “+” Suppose there is a path Co, Cl, . . . , Ck in &s from C = Ca 
to some conflict node Ck. Then there are roles PI,. . . , Pk such that Pi is necessary on 
some concept in Ci- 1, and C; = range( Pi, Ci_ 1) . Obviously, C; # 8 for every i E O..k. 
Assume that AI fl . . . n A,, is S-satisfiable. Then there is a model Z = (A’, -‘) of 
S with an element d E A’ such that d E A: n . . . n Ai. We show by induction that 
for every i E O..k we have nAEc, A’ # 0. The claim for i = 0 coincides with our 
assumption. Suppose that di_1 E A’ for every A E Ci_1. Since Pi is necessary on some 
A E C;_ I, there exists an element di such that (di- 1, di) E Pi”. Moreover, for every 
B E CL we have di E B’, since there is a transition A--%sB for some A E Ci_1. It 
follows that dk E nBECt B’, which is impossible because Ck is a conflict node. 
“e=” Suppose that no conflict node is reachable by a path issuing from C. We 
construct a model Z of S such that A: n . . . n AZ # 0. We define AZ as the set of 
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all nodes i:n G’s that are reachable by a (possibly empty) path issuing from C. For a 
concept name A we define 
A’ := {C’ E A’ 1 A’ E C’ for some A’ 3s A}. 
For a role .P we define 
Pr := {(C’, range( P, C’) ) ( C’ E AZ and P is necessary on some A’ E C’}. 
We have to check that Z satisfies every axiom in S. 
Suppose that P C A x B E S. Let (C’, C”) E P’. Then there is some A’ E C’ 
such that P is necessary on A’. Thus, there is some A” with A’ 5~ A” such that 
A” 5 (2 1 P) E S. Since S is isa-complete, we have A” 5s A. Hence, A’ -& A, 
which implies C’ E A’. Also, there is a transition A’PsB, which implies that B E C”. 
Hence, C” E B’. 
We now show that Z satisfies all axioms of the form A C C in S. Consider a concept 
name A and some C’ E A’. Then there exists some A’ 3s A with A’ E C’. 
Suppose that A C B E S. Then C’ E B’, since A’ 5s B. 
Suppose that A & (2 1 P) E S. Then P is necessary on A’. With C” := range( P, C’) 
we have 
(i) (C’,C”) is an edge in Gs, 
(ii) C” E A’, and 
(iii) (C’,C”) E PI. 
Suppose that A L VP.B E S. Let (C’, C”) E P’. Then B E C”, since C” = 
range( P, C’), which implies that C” E B’. 
Suppose that A E (< 1 P) E S. This axiom is satisfied because, by construction of 
Z, every role is interpreted as a partial function. 
Suppose that A L TB E S. Assume that C’ E B’. Then there is some B’ <_s B with 
B’ E C’. This implies that C’ is a conflict node, which is impossible, since A’ contains 
only nodes reachable from C, and no conflict node can be reached from C. 0 
Proof of Llemma 4.18. “*” Suppose there is a path CO, Cl, . . . , Ck in G’s from Ca = 
{A,,..., A,,,} to some conflict node Ck_ We show that there is a path co, cl,. . . ,& in 
Ds such that 61 2 C! for 1 E O..k and & is a conflict node. This yields the claim because 
&~CO={A,,... , A,} and, since (?a is a node in ‘Ds, it is nonempty and has at most 
two elements. We proceed by induction on k - 1. 
Base case: Since Ck is a conflict node in &, there are names Bk, Bk E Ck such that 
there are B;, i!$ with Bk 3s Bi, fik 5s 86, and Bi & -&k E S. Hence, & := (Bk, Bk) 
is a conflict node in Ds. 
Inductive case: Suppose that cl = {BI, Bj} 2 Ci has already been defined and that the 
edge from (31-r to Cr is labeled with P. By definition of f&r, the role P is necessary on 
some c E C!r-r . Hence, P is necessary on dom( P) because S is dichotomic. Also there 
are transitions CL_sBl, CAsbr in S for some C, c E Cl-r. 
Let us say that a transition AP‘sB is proper if there is an A’ with A 5s A’ and 
A’ C VP.B E S, and improper otherwise. Note that in a dichotomic schema S we have 
A -& dom( P) if A&sB is proper and that B = cod(P) if AP‘sB is improper. 
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We distinguish three cases: 
(i) the two transitions CLsBl, C&se, are both proper; 
(ii) one transition is proper and the other is not; 
(iii) none of the two transitions is proper. 
In case (i), we define f1-r := {C, c}. The properness of the two transitions implies 
that there is a P-edge in Vs from c-1 to ($. 
In case (ii), since CA_~BI is proper, C 3s dom( P), and fin = cod(P), because 
~?Asl?, is improper. Hence, S contains also the transition CAss,. Thus, there is 
an edge with label P from (?l_t := {C} to cl. 
In case (iii), since both transitions are improper, BI = b1 = cod(P). From the fact 
that P is necessary on c E Cr_t it follows, because of the dichotomy of S, that c 3s 
dam(P). Hence, S contains the transitions (? ’ -sBl and cAsj[, which yields a 
P-edge in 23s from c-t := {c} to el;. 
Summarizing, we have shown that in each of the three cases there is a nonempty set 
cl;_ r c Cj- I with I& 1) < 2 from which there is an edge to cl in Vs. 
“+” Suppose there is a path 
{Bo,~o}%{Bd,}, . . ., {&-I,%,}%{Bdk} 
in Ds from {Bo, 80) = {Ai, Aj} to some conflict node (Bk, Bk}. We inductively define 
Co := {Al,. . . , A,,} and Cl := range(Pl,Cl_t) for 1 E l..k. Obviously, {Bl, fin} C Cl for 
any 1 f O..k. Moreover, since each PI is necessary on its domain, and Bl, & 3s dom( P), 
CI_~ and Cl are linked in GS by an edge with label Pl. Since Bk, ijk E Ck, we have that 
Ck is a conflict node in Gs. 
Summarizing, we have exhibited a path in G’s that connects {Al,. . . , Am} to the 
conflict node Ck. 0 
Proof of Lemma 4.21. “+” If C is satisfiable, then by Lemma 4.5 there is a model 
3 = (Az,pg) of SC such that A$ # 0. We modify 3’ to a model Z of Sc with AZ f 0 
and At = 0. 
Let Z have the same domain as 3. We define AZ := 8 for i E O..k. On the other 
concept and role names, 7 coincides with .9. 
Obviously, Z satisfies every axiom in Se that occurs in Sc. Also, every axiom 
A; 5 VP-’ *Ai_, for i E l..k is satisfied by Z because AZ = 8. Finally, we consider the 
case of the subconcept D = VQ.1. Since J is a model of Sc, no element of As has a 
filler for any role P E PC. This shows that every axiom AD C vP.Ak with P E PC is 
satisfied. 
Summing up, we have shown that there is a model Z of Sc such that AZ $ AC. We 
conclude that Sc # AC & Ao. 
“e” Suppose that Sc # AC L Ao. Then there is a model J’ = (A, ..7) of Sc and an 
element do E A such that do E A,, 3 but do $ A$. We inductively define a sequence of 
interpretations Xc, Zt , . . . ,I,, on the same domain as J such that Z := Z, is a model of 
SC. The construction is such that for each concept name A and role name P we have 
AT-1 c AZ, c A3 and P’j-l & P*j c P3 for all j E l..n. 
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Base case: We define 10 by A? := {do} and by interpreting all other concept and 
role names as the empty set. 
Inductive case: Suppose Zj-t has been defined. We distinguish three cases: 
(i) Sc contains an axiom A L B and and there is some d E A?--’ \ B=J-‘. If this 
condition holds, define Bq := Bq-l U {d} and let .q and J-1 coincide on the 
other names in SC. 
(ii) SC contains an axiom A 5 (2 1 P) and there is some d E AT--l such that 
there does not exist a d’ with (d, d’) E Pq-I. If this condition holds, since Sc 
contains the same axiom, 3 is a mode1 of Sc, and AT-I G A3, there is some 
d’ with (d, d’) E P3. Define P’J := P’J-’ U {(d, d’)} and let 3 and .q-l 
coincide on the other names in Sc. 
(iii) Sc contains an axiom A C VP.B, A+ Z B # A-, and there are c, c’ such 
that c E Aq, (c, c’) E P’j, but c’ $ Bq. If this condition holds, define 
Bq := #-I I+ {c’} and let .rj and .r-- J 1 coincide on the other names in Sc. 
Note that similarly to case (ii), in the cases (i) and (iii) Sc contains the axioms in 
question, too. Thus, from the fact that J is a model of SC, we conclude that Bq C B3 
and hence the interpretation of a symbol under Zj is a subset of the interpretation 
under 3. 
Since Sc does not contain a cycle, the construction process terminates with an inter- 
pretation I,,. Let Z := 2,. We show that Z is a mode1 of Sc. 
By construction, Z satisfies all axioms of the form A _C B, A C (2 1 P), and 
A C VP.B where A+ # B # A-. Also by construction, we have (A+)’ = (A-)’ = 0. 
Hence, Z satisfies A+ L A-. It remains to show that for all P E PC, the interpretation 
Z satisfies the axioms AD C VP.A+, AD 5 VP.A-, where D = VQ.1. Since (A+)’ = 
(A-)’ = 0: we have to show that no element of A; has a filler for any P E PC. 
Assume, on the contrary, that there is a d E A; and a role P E Pc such that 
(d, d’) E PT. Since A$ C Ag, we have d E As. The schema SC contains the axioms 
A. C VP.&. Hence, d’ E Ak3. 
By induction, it can be shown that for each subconcept E of C, if c E ET, then c is 
reachable in Z from do by a chain of length A(E). Thus, d is reachable in Z from do 
by a chain Iof length A(D). 
We have A(I) = k, which imples A(D) = k - 1. Thus, there is a chain do, dl,. . . , 
dk-2, d. This chain can be extended to a chain of length k from do to d’. Also, Pz 2 P” 
for all P E PC, so that do, dl, . . . , d, d’ is a chain of length k in J, too. Now, since 
J’ satisfies the axioms A; C VP-‘*Ai_1 for i E l..k, it follows that do E A{, which 
contradicts our initial assumption about do. Therefore, no element A; has a filler for 
any P E Pc, which completes our proof that Z is a mode1 of SC. 0 
Proof of Pmposition 5.4. Call _?Z = (S, W) the complete clash-free dLC%‘?-knowledge 
base. We show that the canonical interpretation 2-r is a mode1 of 2. The assertions of 
the form sPt, and s #t in W are obviously satisfied by 12. The assertions of the 
form s: C can be proved to be satisfied based on known results for (analogous) con- 
straint system s (see e.g., [6]); the proof is by induction on the structure of C. 
We treat only the case s:VP.D to clarify the restrictions on applicability of rule S2. 
We have to show that for all d with (s, d) E Pzz it holds that d E 04. First we 
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prove that it cannot be d = u. In fact, the pair (s,u) is added to P’-’ only if there 
is no spt in W, but for some A, s: A is in W and A 5 (2 1 P) is in S. Now 
since also s:VP.D is in W, rule S2 would be applicable, contradicting the hypothe- 
sis that 2 is complete. Therefore, d # CL Hence from the definition of PI-’ in the 
canonical interpretation the assertion sPd is in W, and since S is complete, also d: D 
must be in S (application of rule V3). Then by induction hypothesis we have d E 
DlS. 
For axioms of the form A C C, we have to prove that for every d E A”, if d is in 
AZ’ then d is in Czz. Based on the definition of 22, the domain element d can be in 
AZx in two cases: either d = u or d = s and s: A is in W. 
In the first case, from the definition of 12, one can verify that u is in the extension 
of every SC-concept, thus u is in CT-‘, too. 
In the second case, if C is either of the form B or (< 1 P) then the axiom is satisfied 
based on the following line of reasoning: Since s: A is in W and 2 is complete, based 
on the schema rules S4 and S5, s: C is in W too, and therefore s E Czz. 
Suppose now that A 5 VP.B is in S and s: A is in W. We have to show that for all 
d such that (s, d) E Pzz, we have that d E BZZ. From the definition of 12, for any 
such d either d = u or there exists t such that d = t and SPZ is in W. In the first case, u 
is in B’z because of the definition of 2,. In the second case, since 2 is complete, for 
the rule S3, t: B is in W and thus t E BZx by definition of Zz. 
Consider now the case that A C (2 1 P) is in S and s: A is in W. If there exists an 
individual t such that sPt is in W, then (s, t) is in PI-‘, and therefore s is in (2 1 P)‘“. 
In case there is no t such that sPt is in W, then based on the definition of Zr, (s, u) is 
in P’-‘, and thus s E (3 1 P)zx again. 
One can prove that the axioms of the form P C Al x AZ are satisfied by 12, using 
similar arguments. q 
Proof of Proposition 5.6. 
(i) By induction on the application of rules. By hypothesis, the assertion y;: D has 
been added by a view rule, therefore we do not consider schema rules. For view 
rules, the induction is straightforward, e.g., if rule V4’ is applied because y;: 3R.D is 
in W (condition 1 ), it adds the new assertion y;+r : D. By the induction hypothesis, 
depth( 3R.D) < depth(C) - i. For the new assertion, the claim holds since depth(D) = 
depth(3R.D) - 1 < depth(C) - (i+ 1). 
(ii) Suppose no: Then, there is a direct successor yk+i of yk, with k = ICI. But such 
a successor has been introduced by the application of a generating rule, requiring the 
presence in W of an assertion of the form yk: D, where either D = VP.E (rule S2’), 
or D = 3R.E (rule V4’), or D = (2 rz R) (rule VS). Observe that all the concepts 
involved are subconcepts of C, hence Proposition 5.6(i) above applies: depth(D) < 
depth(C) -k = depth(C) - ICI. H owever, depth(C) is obviously less or equal than ICI 
and therefore depth(D) < 0. Since depth(D) is at least 1, a contradiction follows. 
(iii) The number N is bounded by the sum of all numbers n in concepts of the form 
(2 n R), plus all concepts of the form 3R.D, both appearing in C, plus all concepts of 
the form VP.D appearing in C (condition 1 of the generating rule S2). Hence, N < ICI, 
if numbers are coded in unary notation. 
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(iv) The individuals in a trace are a chain X, yi , . . . , yiz plus all their direct successors. 
Therefore the total number of individuals in a trace is bounded by (h + 1) . (N + 1) < 
( IC 1 + 1)2 which is in 0( ]C 1’). The number of assertions of the form s: D is then 
0( ]C12.( ]C’l+lSl)) (each subconcept of either C or S, times the number of individuals). 
Given that in assertions s # t the individuals s, t must be both direct successors of the 
same individual, generated by the application of a rule VS, the number of assertions 
s # t is 0( N2 . ICI) = 0( ]C13). Finally, in the assertions of the form spt the individual 
t must be a direct successor of s, hence their total number is 0( ICI . N) = 0( lC12). We 
conclude that the number of assertions in a trace (hence its size) is polynomial in ICI 
and linear in ISI. 
(v) A proof for a similar problem is given in [ 191 by showing that each rule 
application in ,Z can be transformed into a trace rule application in a set of traces. 
By Proposition 5.5 the “successor” relation restricted to new individuals forms a tree. 
Hence, every completion can be decomposed into as many parts as there are branches in 
the successor tree. No assertion is lost, since the conditions of application of each rule 
are local, i.e., they depend only on an individual and (possibly) its direct successors. 
(vi) The: claim follows from the locality of clashes: All two types of clash depend on 
an individual s, and on assertions involving either s alone (first type of clash) or both 
s and direct successors of s (second type of clash). If 2’ contains a clash, consider the 
trace in which the successors of s-if any-are generated (there always must be such a 
trace, from the previous point and from the strategy of application of trace rules). That 
trace contains the same clash as 2’. 0 
Proof of Proposition 5.8. “*” Each precompletion is derived from 2 using completion 
rules. If _Z i.tself is not a precompletion, then a rule is applicable to an old individual. If .Z 
is satisfiable, Theorem 5.2( ii) says that there exists a satisfiable knowledge base directly 
derived from 2 by applying that rule. If the new knowledge base is not a precompletion, 
one can repeat the same argument, and so on until a satisfiable precompletion is reached. 
This calculus for obtaining a satisfiable precompletion eventually terminates, because it 
is just a restricted version of the general calculus-i.e., the condition of application of 
the rules are more restrictive. 
“+” B:y induction on the number of rule applications needed to obtain 2’ from 2. 
The base case is trivial, while in the inductive case Theorem 5.2(i) proves the claim. 0 
Proof of Proposition 5.9. “=x” Obviously, a precompletion must be clash-free to be 
satisfiable. For each new individual n, let C, be the conjunction of the concepts D such 
that X: D is in W,. Obviously, the knowledge base (S, X: CX) is satisfiable if and only 
if (S, WL) is satisfiable (it is sufficient to apply rule Vl as many times to decompose 
again C,). Combining Propositions 5.6 and 5.4, we know that (S, X: CX) is satisfiable if 
and only if there exists a finite, clash-free completion of it. Such a clash-free completion 
contains a ‘clash-free completion of (S, W:). 
‘<*=,’ Suppose there exists a clash-free precompletion 2’ = (S, W’) such that for 
each new individual x in W’, the knowledge base (S, W:) has a clash-free completion; 
then one can compute a clash-free completion of 2’ as the union of 2’ and, for each 
X, the clash-free completion of (S, W:) (up to renaming of new individuals). Recall 
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that all application conditions of each completion rule are local, i.e., whether or not 
a rule is applied depends on assertions about one individual s, and possibly its direct 
successors. Hence, a completion of 2 can actually be constructed from 2’ and from 
separate completions of (S, IV:), since each rule application in one completion does 
not need to check for assertions from other completions. Since also clash conditions are 
local, such a completion is clash-free, and by Proposition 5.4, 2 is satisfiable. 0 
Proof of Proposition 5.10. Let N be the maximal number of direct successors of an 
old individual in a precompletion: similarly to Proposition 5.6( iii), N is bounded by the 
sum of all numbers n in concepts of the form (2 n I?), plus all concepts of the form 
3R.C, plus all concepts of the form VP.C, all appearing in W. Hence, N < /WI, if 
numbers are coded in unary notation. Call o the number of old individuals. The total 
number of individuals in the precompletion is then w old individuals, plus at most N. w 
new individuals; in total O(w . (N + 1)) which is in 0( lW1’). This proves that the 
number of individuals does not depend on IS/. 
The number of possible (sub)concepts is 0( ISI + IWl); hence the number of asser- 
tions of the form s: C is bounded by the number of individuals times the number of 
possible concepts, that is 0( IW12. (ISI + /W[) ). Similarly, the number of assertions s + t 
is bounded by 6.1~ (UNA on old individuals) plus w. N2, that is 0( lW13). The number 
of assertions of the form sPt is bounded by o2 . IWI relations between old individuals 
plus w . N, that is, 0( lW13). S umming up all assertions, the size of a precompletion is 
ww2~ w + IW>>. 0 
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